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During the 1991-1992 term, the United States Supreme Court issued
several decisions in cases of importance for local governments. The
discussion below analyzes the Court's decisions in two areas: the ap-
plicability of the Voting Rights Act to transfers of functions of local
governments,' and the determination of when a governmental regulation
constitutes a taking that requires compensation under the Eminent Do-
main Clause. 2 In other significant decisions, the Court continued to
define the contours of liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,1 and several
First Amendment cases also involved local governments as defendants. 4
Federal courts of appeals were also active in litigation, involving
local governments. Two types of cases predominated-claims of em-
Copyright 1993, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
* J. Denson Smith Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State
University.
1. Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 820 (1992); see infra notes 52-
94 and accompanying text.
2. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992); Yee v. City
of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992); see infra notes 136-195 and accompanying text.
3. Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 112 S. Ct. 1061 (1992) (allegation that city's
inadequate safety training of sanitation employees constitutes a custom or policy of
deliberate indifference toward its employees did not state a claim under § 1983); Hudson
v. McMillan, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992) (use of excessive physical force against a prisoner
may constitute cruel and unusual punishment even if the prisoner does not suffer severe
injury); see also Hafer v. Melo, 112 S. Ct. 358 (1991) (state officers may be held personally
liable under § 1983 for actions taken in their official capacities); cf. Franklin v. Gwinnett
County Pub. Schs., 112 S. Ct. 1028 (1992) (damages are available to a student in an
action to enforce the sexual harassment prohibitions of Title IX of Education Amendments
of 1972).
4. See, e.g., International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 112 S.
Ct. 2701, 2709 (1992) (airport terminal is a non-public forum for which a prohibition on
repetitive solicitation of funds inside terminal is permissible, but a ban on the distribution
of literature inside the terminal is not); Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (invocation
at graduation ceremonies of public high school violates Establishment Clause); R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) ("hate crimes" ordinance is facially invalid);
Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 112 S. Ct. 2395 (1992) (permit fee based on
the content of the expected speech or the hostility that it is likely to engender is facially
invalid because it is not content-neutral).
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ployees who had been disciplined or discharged5 and claims of members
of the public who had allegedly been injured by some governmental
action.6 Other noteworthy decisions involved the First Amendment,7 equal
5. See, e.g., Kinsey v. Salado Indep. Sch. Dist., 950 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1992) (en
banc) (termination of school superintendent, who occupies high-level, policy-making, and
confidential position, for his opposition to winning candidates in school board election
does not violate the First Amendment rights of superintendent), cert. denied, 112 S..Ct.
2275 (1992); Brewer v. Chauvin, 938 F.2d 860 (8th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (public employee
who is discharged in violation of procedural due process is entitled to back pay from
the date of discharge to the earliest date discharge could have taken effect had proper
procedures been followed, but full award of back pay requires finding that the discharge
would not have occurred if proper procedures had been followed); Hiraldo-Cancel v.
Aponte, 925 F.2d 10 (1st Cir.) (even though municipal employees were employed in
violation of commonwealth law, Constitution forbade mayor from firing them based on
their political affiliation), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 637 (1991); see also Upton v. Thompson,
930 F.2d 1209 (7th Cir. 1991) (sheriff deputies enjoy sufficient autonomy and discretionary
authority such that elected sheriff may consider party loyalty in discharging deputies),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1262 (1992).
6. See, e.g., Auriemma v. Rice, 957 F.2d 397 (7th Cir. 1992) (city is not liable for
police chief's discriminatory actions in violation of municipal ordinances because a pol-
icymaker for purposes of § 1983 liability is the person with legislative authority to adopt
rules for the conduct of government and does not include the final executive authority
responsible for enforcing the rules); Charbonnet v. Lee, 951 F.2d 638 (5th Cir.) (deputy
sheriff's participation in removal of private property without legal process was not an
actionable deprivation of procedural due process under § 1983 because it was redressable
under adequate state post-deprivation remedies), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2994 (1992);
Kopf v. Wing, 942 F.2d 265 (4th Cir. 1991) (numerous incidents of alleged excessive force
by county officers coupled with statistics showing a reluctance to sustain complaints of
brutality administratively and policies of destroying records of internal investigations and
forbidding photographs of wounds inflicted by police dogs are sufficient to preclude
summary judgment on the issue of whether county has an unconstitutional custom or
practice of allowing incidents of excessive force to go unpunished), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 1179 (1992); Calhoun v. St. Bernard Parish, 937 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1991) (local
legislators are entitled to legislative immunity for damage claims, but builder's claims for
injunctive and declaratory relief against legislators in their official capacities survive motion
to dismiss), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 939 (1992); compare Redman v. County of San
Diego, 942 F.2d 1435 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc) ("deliberate indifference" is the proper
standard for analyzing a claim that jail officials' decisions on housing of homosexual
inmates, and the county policies underlying those decisions violated the due process rights
of a heterosexual detainee who was raped by an aggressive homosexual with whom he
shared a cell), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 972 (1992), with McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d
344 (7th Cir. 1991) (prison officials are liable for inmate's rape by another inmate only
if they have actual knowledge of an impending assault that was easily preventable), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1265 (1992).
7. See, e.g., Gaudiya Vaishnava Soc'y v. City of San Francisco, 952 F.2d 1059 (9th
Cir. 1992) (city ordinance that prohibits non-profit organization from selling on public
sidewalks without commercial peddler's license and that grants police chief unguided
discretion to grant or to deny permit violates First Amendment), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1951 (1992); D.G. Restaurant Corp. v. City of Myrtle Beach, 953 F.2d 140 (4th Cir.
1991) (city ordinance that regulates location of nude entertainment businesses for express
[Vol. 53
LOCAL GOVERNMENT LA W
protection,' and due process, 9 as well as the construction of the Voting
Rights Act 0 and the Fair Housing Act.'
The Louisiana Supreme Court issued at least eleven opinions in
litigation involving local governments. The discussion below analyzes
one-the decision barring a school board from imposing a prevailing
wage requirement on public works contracts.' 2 The other cases covered
a variety of topics. Three construed civil service statutes, 3 and a fourth
concerned teacher certification. 4 In addition, the court decided two tort
purpose of avoiding deleterious effects on city neighborhoods is not aimed at message
conveyed by topless dancing but rather is narrowly tailored to serve substantial govern-
mental interest in preserving quality of neighborhoods and thus does not violate First
Amendment).
8. See, e.g., Podberesky v. Kirwan, 956 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1992) (district court's
failure to make specific findings of present effects of past racial discrimination by state
university requires reversal of judgment that scholarship program limited to black students
does not violate Title VI of Civil Rights Act or the Fourteenth Amendment); Coral Constr.
Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910 (9th Cir. 1991) (county ordinance that requires set-
aside for benefit of businesses owned by certain racial and ethnic minorities in awarding
public contracts is unconstitutional because the statistical evidence failed to establish the
requisite compelling governmental interest), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 875 (1992); Tennessee
Asphalt Co. v. Farris, 942 F.2d 969 (6th Cir. 1991) (state receiving federal highway
construction funds does not violate equal protection guarantees when it implements a set-
aside program for disadvantaged business subcontractors in federally funded contracts
without making a finding of prior discrimination in highway construction).
9. Brookpark Entertainment, Inc. v. Taft, 951 F.2d 710 (6th Cir. 1991) (statute that
authorizes revocation by popular referendum of license of liquor establishment that has
violated any liquor law violates Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 68 (1992).
10. Badillo v. City of Stockton, 956 F.2d 884 (9th Cir. 1992) (city's change from
single-member district to at-large voting system for city council elections does not violate
§ 2 of the Voting Rights Act in the absence of a showing that minorities have voted
cohesively for minorities in the past and that they have the potential to elect minority
representatives).
11. E.g., Elliott v. City of Athens, 960 F.2d 975 (1lth Cir. 1992) (zoning ordinance
providing that no more than four unrelated persons may reside in a dwelling in a single-
family residential zone falls within housing act's exemption for reasonable maximum
occupancy restrictions even though it may have some disparate impact on handicapped
occupants desiring to live in group homes), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 376 (1992).
12. Louisiana Assoc. Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Calcasieu Parish Sch. Bd., 586 So.
2d 1354 (La. 1991); see infra notes 95-135 and accompanying text.
13. Knecht v. Board of Trustees for State Colleges, 591 So. 2d 690 (La. 1991)
(employees had valid and enforceable contract right to receive accrued compensatory time);
New Orleans Firefighters Ass'n v. City of New Orleans, 590 So. 2d 1172 (La. 1991)
(power to impose residency requirements upon municipal employees is not exclusively
vested in city civil service commission); Shields v. City of Shreveport, 579 So. 2d 961
(La. 1991) (evidence that showed police officers consumed alcohol while performing security
duty at a high school reunion was sufficient to establish that officers were discharged
for their actions and not for their status or condition as alcoholics).
14. Eiche v. Louisiana Bd. of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 582 So. 2d 186 (La.
1993]
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cases involving local governments; 15 and individual decisions analyzed
land use,' 6 expropriation, 7 taxation,' 8 and public records 9 issues.
As usual, Louisiana's courts of appeal provided the greatest volume
of opinions in cases involving local governments. The largest numbers
of these cases concerned public employees, land use, and the tort liability
of local governments.
Employment decisions considered both constitutional and statutory
issues. This year, the constitutional claims focused on procedural ques-
tions, 20 but the statutory cases were not so limited. The opinions in-
1991) (provisions of statute providing for revocation or expiration of teaching certificates
upon failure of teacher to obtain satisfactory evaluations fell within board's certification
authority).
15. Roberts v. Benoit, 586 So. 2d 131 (La. 1991), aff'd on rehearing, 603 So. 2d
150 (La. 1992) (sheriff is not liable in his official capacity for injury caused by accidental
discharge of gun owned by off-duty deputy); Socorro v. City of New Orleans, 579 So.
2d 931 (La. 1991) (statutory cap on general damages could not be applied retroactively).
16. City of Baton Rouge v. Schmieder, 582 So. 2d 1266 (La. 1991) (zoning ordinance
provision that prohibited building on any servitude on a lot is not unconstitutionally
vague).
17. State Through Dep't of Transp. & Dev. v. Chambers Inv. Co., 595 So. 2d 598
(La. 1992) (owner's right to develop land for residential purposes was recognized property
right for which compensation was required, but delay damages were erroneously awarded
in absence of evidence of ultrahazardous activities, abusive or excessive conduct, or acts
causing physical property damage or personal injury).
18. Reed v. City of New Orleans, 593 So. 2d 368 (La. 1992) (tobacco consumption
privilege tax was an unconstitutional sale, use, and consumption tax enacted without
legislative authorization and voter approval). For other recent decisions regarding the
taxing authority of the city of New Orleans, see City of New Orleans v. Scramuzza, 507
So. 2d 215 (La. 1987), analyzed in Kenneth M. Murchison, Local Government Law,
Developments in the Law, 1987-1988, 49 La. L. Rev. 367, 388-93 (1988); Acorn v. City
of New Orleans, 407 So. 2d 1225 (La. 1981), analyzed in Kenneth M. Murchison, Local
Government Law, Developments in the Law, 1981-1982, 43 La. L. Rev. 461, 474-76
(1982); Acorn v. City of New Orleans, 377 So. 2d 1206 (La. 1979), analyzed in Kenneth
M. Murchison, Local Government Law, Developments in the Law, 1979-1980, 41 La. L.
Rev. 483, 493-500 (1981) [hereinafter 1979-1980 Developments].
19. Lemmon v. Connick, 590 So. 2d 574 (La. 1991) (postconviction relief is not
"criminal litigation" as that term is used in the exemption to the Public Records Law).
20. Brown v. Housing Auth., 590 So. 2d 1258 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991) (written
charges were not required before employee is furnished the predischarge hearing required
to satisfy due process); cf. Bexar County Sheriff's Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Davis, 802
S.W.2d 659 (Tex. 1990) (employee need not be notified of names of witnesses against
him in dismissal action), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 57 (1991); see also Frye v. Louisiana
State Univ. Medical Ctr., 584 So. 2d 259 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991) (state employee was
not entitled to a prediscipline hearing before a one-day suspension was imposed); Greenleaf
v. Department of Health & Hosp., 594 So. 2d 418 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991) (delay of
five months between submission of posthearing memorandum by employee and decision
of the state civil service commission did not deny employee due process), writ denied,
596 So. 2d 196 (1992). For an analysis of earlier Louisiana decisions defining the procedural
protection that the Constitution provides for employees of local governments, see Kenneth
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terpreting the civil service laws addressed questions regarding the
rulemaking authority of civil service commissions, 2  as well as the
procedural 22 and substantive23 protections provided to public employees.
Similarly, the cases involving school employees covered the applicability
M. Murchison, Local Government Law, Developments in the Law, 1986-1987, 48 La. L.
Rev. 303, 322-27 (1987) [hereinafter 1986-1987 Developments].
21. City of Baton Rouge v. Municipal Fire & Police Civil Serv. Bd., 597 So. 2d 573
(La. App. 1st Cir.) (employees with dispatching responsibilities must be retained in the
municipal fire and police civil service despite the creation of a new communications district
with management control over them), writ denied, 599 So. 2d 306 (1992); Saulter v.
Sewerage & Water Bd., 593 So. 2d 767 (La. App. 4th Cir.) (board did not have authority
to extend employees' work week from 35 to 40 hours without prior approval of civil
service commission), writ denied, 595 So. 2d 656 (1992); Bruno v. City of New Orleans,
583 So. 2d 10 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991) (city civil service commission had to include state
supplemental pay of police officers as well as their regular pay from city in calculating
holiday wages); cf. Casse v. Department of Health & Hosp., 597 So. 2d 547 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1992) (state had to hold a hearing with respect to allegations challenging layoff
plan as improvidently approved); Beter v. Department of Wildlife & Fisheries, 592 So.
2d 1359 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991) (decision of state commission that senior district director
was not entitled to bump junior district director when the senior director's district was
absorbed by junior director's district was not clearly wrong).
22. Pugh v. Department of Culture, Recreation & Tourism, 597 So. 2d 38 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1992) (public employee who resigned in order to avoid disciplinary action had
30 days from date of resignation to challenge voluntariness of resignation); cf. Cummings
v. Harahan Mun. Fire & Police Civil Serv. Bd., 590 So. 2d 1359 (La. App. 5th Cir.
1991) (claim for back wages for wrongful discharge was outside the scope of a statute
imposing a 15-day limit on an employee's right to appeal corrective or disciplinary action).
23. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Department of Streets, 593 So. 2d 1352 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1992) (evidence of employee's failure to follow established departmental procedures
relative to sick leave and annual leave was adequate to support suspension for five days);
Cannatella v. Department of Civil Serv., 592 So. 2d 1374 (La. App. 4th Cir.) (police
officer's announcement of association's endorsement in mayoral election did not violate
prohibition against political activity by employees in classified service), writ denied, 596
So. 2d 215 (1992); Marcantel v. Department of Transp. & Dev., 590 So. 2d 1253 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1991) (allegation that department appointed a person with less seniority
and fewer qualifications to settle a pending lawsuit stated a claim for discrimination);
Davis v. Department of Police, 590 So. 2d 850 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991) (evidence
supported the fifteen-day suspension of officer who was at fault in intersection collision
that occurred while the officer was driving a police vehicle); Eubanks v. City of Opelousas,
590 So. 2d 740 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991) (city's termination of street commissioner was
removal of an employee rather than abolition of office, so that employee's exclusive
remedy arose under the civil service law); Lambert v. Jefferson Parish Library Dep't, 582
So. 2d 326 (La. App. 5th Cir.) (unsatisfactory rating given to parish librarian did nbt
warrant termination absent showing that alleged violations of policy impaired efficient
operation of the library), writ denied, 586 So. 2d 532 (1991); Hatzgionidis v. Department
of Police, 580 So. 2d 471 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991) (evidence supported commission's
conclusion that officer knowingly violated limited duty prohibition against outside work




of tenure laws4 and the scope of judicial review, 25 in addition to the
substantive 26 and procedural27 protections provided in disciplinary cases.
Other appellate decisions also considered disability retirement s and ethical29
issues.
The land use decisions examined various questions regarding the
state's zoning law. Most of the zoning opinions involved prescription
issues,30 but the appellate courts also considered several other topics.
The significant issues included the limits of zoning authority, 3' vari-
ances, 32 nonconforming uses, 33 and the scope of review in rezoning
cases.
34
24. Guillory v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 597 So. 2d 96 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992)
(teachers whose positions were paid by federal funds did not acquire tenure in those
positions).
25. Muggivan v. Jefferson Parish Sch. Bd., 583 So. 2d 1157 (La. App. 5th Cir.)
(district court was not authorized to conduct a trial de novo when reviewing school board's
decision to discharge teacher), writ denied, 590 So. 2d 66 (1991).
26. Hargis v. Lafourche Parish Sch. Bd., 593 So. 2d 400 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991)
(assistant principal's willful neglect by being tardy and leaving campus without permission
justified demotion to classroom teacher).
27. Guy v. Madison Parish Sch. Bd., 579 So. 2d 1108 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991)
(postdischarge grievance procedures were inadequate to comply with statutory mandate to
provide school bus operator notice and opportunity to be heard prior to discharge).
28. Cousins v. City of New Orleans, 594 So. 2d 1107 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1992)
(disability retirement benefits were not earned remuneration and could serve as offset
against worker's compensation benefits); Matthews v. City of Alexandria, 587 So. 2d 799
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1991) (city was entitled to a credit on workers' compensation benefits
for disability retirement benefits drawn by workers), remanded on other grounds, 592 So.
2d 1285 (1992).
29. Bagert v. State Bd. of Ethics, 588 So. 2d 1264 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991) (ethics
statute did not prevent police juror from contracting with hospital service district because
the district was not under the jurisdiction of the parish).
30. See, e.g., Elysian Fields, Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 593 So. 2d 952 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1992) (where preceding licensee had applied for permit for "nightclub," city had
actual written notice of nonconforming use so as to begin the two-year prescriptive period
for enforcement of zoning ordinance); City of New Orleans v. C.N.A.P.C.O., Inc., 591
So. 2d 1338 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991) (prescriptive period for enforcement of zoning
ordinance began to run when city received letter advising city of live music at restaurant
and bar), writ denied, 594 So. 2d 891 (1992); City of Baton Rouge/Parish of E. Baton
Rouge v. Grand, 588 So. 2d 1274 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991) (occupational license issued
to contractor did not provide city with notice of his business activities in violation of
zoning ordinance), writ denied, 590 So. 2d 1201 (1992); Panzeca v. City of New Orleans,
580 So. 2d 489 (La. App. 4th Cir.) (two-year prescriptive period for zoning violations
began to run when city sent an initial written notice to property owners advising them
that they had failed to comply with the requirements for classification as a nonconforming
use), writ denied, 585 So. 2d 566, 567 (1991).
31. Saltamachia v. Parish of Jefferson, 579 So. 2d 1197 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1991)
(property owners' allegations that continued residential zoning of their property was an
unreasonable exercise of the police power of the parish because commercial development
of surrounding properties rendered their lots unsuitable for residential use stated a cause
of action).
32. Curran v. Board of Zoning Adjustments, 580 So. 2d 417 (La. App. 4th Cir.)
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The tort cases included the most diverse assortment of issues that
are important to local governments. They analyzed problems in iden-
tifying the responsible governmental entity," the standard of care ap-
plicable in negligence 6 and strict liability1  actions, the scope of the
(granting variance to zoning ordinance was an abuse of discretion absent evidence that
property owner would be subjected to hardship if the variance were not granted), writ
denied, 584 So. 2d 679 (1991).
33. Save Our Neighborhoods v. St. John the Baptist Parish, 592 So. 2d 908 (La.
App. 5th Cir. 1991) (rezoning of tract from residential to heavy industrial did not constitute
piecemeal zoning that would give rise to a higher level of scrutiny where the tract was
contiguous with heavy industry district and ordinance merely extended that district), writ
denied, 594 So. 2d 892 (La. 1992). For a recent decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court
regarding the scope of review in rezoning cases, see Palermo Land Co. v. Planning
Comm'n, 561 So. 2d 482 (La. 1990), analyzed in Kenneth M. Murchison, Local Government
Law, Developments in the Law, 1990-1991, 52 La. L. Rev. 541, 557-63 (1992).
34. Parish of Jefferson v. Charnel, 591 So. 2d 796 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1991) (property
owner had the burden of proving claim of nonconforming use status).
35. Ford v. New Orleans Sewerage & Water Bd., 594 So. 2d 1088 (La. App. 4th
Cir.) (city worker could not bring tort action against city for actions of alleged employee
of board because board was part of city government), writ denied, 602 So. 2d 719 (1992);
Langley v. City of Monroe, 582 So. 2d 367 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991) (parish police jury
was not liable for sexual assault on plaintiff prisoner because it did not require inmate
to be incarcerated in the city jail and it had no power over the sheriff who arranged for
the transfer of the inmate from the parish jail to the city jail); Howard v. City of
Alexandria, 581 So. 2d 321 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991) (city was liable for the actions of
an employee who was driving a city truck to lunch when the accident occurred).
36. Persilver v. Louisiana Dep't of Transp., 592 So. 2d 1344 (La. App. Ist Cir.
1991) (city police officers owed no duty to apprehend an intoxicated bar patron in order
to prevent him from driving, no duty to arrest the patron for disorderly conduct, and
no other duty beyond taking the patron's car keys away and giving them to a friend);
Simmons v. City of Monroe, 588 So. 2d 1357 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991) (city failed to
use reasonable care to protect visitors against hazardous condition inside the city hall
where the city sold concession items but had no cleanup policy outside and no routine
policing of the city hall steps), writ denied, 591 So. 2d 708 (1992); DuBois v. McGuire,
579 So. 2d 1025 (La. App. 4th Cir.) (parish was not negligent in deciding to use a
confinement note after catching a stray dog), writ denied, 587 So. 2d 696 (1991). On the
duty of school officials to control the aggressive conduct of students, see Coleman v.
Joyner, 593 So. 2d 451 (La. App. 2d Cir.) (school board did not breach any duty or
act unreasonably in controlling a student who had previously engaged in a fight before
injuring plaintiff), writ denied, 595 So. 2d 657 (1992); Oast v. Lafayette Parish Sch. Bd.,
591 So. 2d 1257 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991) (one episode of pushing and shoving in student's
high school career was insufficient to form a pattern of violence so as to render school
board and coach liable for an injury a spectator suffered when that student threw a chair
after competing in a wrestling match).
37. Durkee v. City of Shreveport, 587 So. 2d 722 (La. App. 2d Cir.) (trial court's
finding that a city sidewalk was defective so as to give rise to liability under Civil Code
article 2317 was not clearly erroneous), writ denied, 590 So. 2d 68 (1991); Alexander v.
City of Lafayette, 584 So. 2d 327 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991) (exposed tree root over which
pedestrian tripped was not a defect that required the city to be held for resulting damages);
Tisdale v. State Dep't of Transp. & Natural Resources, 581 So. 2d 1045 (La. App. 1st
Cir.) (highway bridge over river did not present unreasonable risk of harm where state
19931
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duties that local governments owe to the public,3" and the proper con-
struction of the state's immunity39 and indemnity 4O statutes.
In the remaining opinions, the courts of appeal addressed a full
spectrum of local government law issues. They analyzed diverse questions
of governmental immunity including the procedures for adopting home
rule charters, 4' preemption, 42 elections, 43 the form of local legislation,"
did not know of prior bridge incidents with recreational users or that recreational use
was prevalent), writ denied, 588 So. 2d 1121 (1991); Labit v. Tangipahoa Parish Council,
581 So. 2d 732 (La. App. 1st Cir.) (parish is strictly liable for damages caused by a
defective bridge when it had actual knowledge of the defects), writ denied, 588 So. 2d
111 (1991).
38. Mack v. City of Monroe, 595 So. 2d 353 (La. App. 2d Cir.) (police owed no
duty to protect friends and relatives of complainant because no personal or individual
relationship existed between them and the officers who investigated the earlier assault
where the complaint was filed), writ denied, 599 So. 2d 314 (1992); Foxworth v. Housing
Auth., 590 So. 2d 1347 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1991) (tenant's complaints to housing authority
regarding threats of other residents did not create a "special relationship" between housing
authority and tenant so that housing authority would have a duty to protect tenant), writ
not considered, 592 So. 2d 1328 (1992).
39, Chaney v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 583 So. 2d 926 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1991) (governing authority's decision whether to place warning signs at particular inter-
section or crossing was operational rather than policy-making or discretionary decision
which would give rise to immunity).
40. Haley v. McManus, 593 So. 2d 1339 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991) (school board had
a statutory obligation to defend and to indemnify a teacher for injuries caused when a
student was beaten with a belt).
41. Tudela v. Broussard, 581 So. 2d 1068 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1991) (commission
established by city council to review city charter and to recommend whether changes
should be made was an advisory commission rather than a charter commission to which
the statutes requiring the submission of the proposed charter to voters were applicable).
42. Doug Reed Enters., Inc. v. City of Baton Rouge, 591 So. 2d 733 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1991) (ordinance regulating towing and storage of motor vehicles did not conflict
with statutory prohibitions except with respect to the amount of the application and
vehicle inspection fees); P. & G. Retailers, Inc. v. Wright, 590 So. 2d 1272 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1991) (state law requiring a "hearing" before a district court when the decisions
of alcoholic beverage control board were challenged preempted a local ordinance that
purported to preclude de novo review in the district court); Jefferson Parish Firefighters
Ass'n v. Parish of Jefferson, 579 So. 2d 1062 (La. App. 5th Cir.) (fire fighter was not
entitled to special sick leave pursuant to state statute where a parish ordinance did not
cover injuries occurring off duty and the legislature had not funded additional sick leave
benefits provided in state law), writ denied, 587 So. 2d 695 (1991).
43. O'Brien v. Giardina, 587 So. 2d 712 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1991) (changes in parish
council brought about by a resolution that resulted from suit in federal court were the
result of a "reapportionment" for purpose of the state constitutional provision relating
to elections following the reapportionment of legislative districts).
44. Eubanks v. City of Opelousas, 590 So. 2d 740 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1991) (abolition
of the office of the street and sanitary commissioner as part of a consolidation of city
departments was an administrative decision that was properly accomplished by resolution
rather than by ordinance).
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annexation, 45 and the relationships of local officers to local governing
bodies. 46 Other important decisions examined the scope of the police
power of local governments 4 7 taxation,4 public contracts,' 9 the Open
Meetings Law, 0 and the Public Records Law."
45. Redmond v. City of Lafayette, 594 So. 2d 566 (La. App. 3d Cir.) (annexation
petitions did not have to include a description of area to be annexed; certification by
parish tax assessor established that city had written assent of a majority of resident
property owners; challengers of annexation ordinance had burden of establishing its
unreasonableness), writ denied, 600 So. 2d 611 (1992). For an analysis of Kansas City
S. Ry. v. City of Shreveport, 354 So. 2d 1362 (La.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 829, 99 S.
Ct. 103 (1978), the most recent comprehensive opinion on annexation from the Louisiana
Supreme Court, see Kenneth M. Murchison, Local Government Law, The Work of the
Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1977-1978 Term, 39 La. L. Rev. 843, 860-69 (1979)
[hereinafter 1977-1978 Developments].
46. Kempf v. Pavy, 595 So. 2d 393 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1992) (district court judges
acted within their authority in approving the appointments of minute clerks and assistant
minute clerks); Shepherd v. City of Baton Rouge/Parish of E. Baton Rouge, 588 So. 2d
1210 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991) (legal stenographer was an employee of the district attorney
rather than the parish and thus was subject to the personnel rules of the district attorney);
Smith v. Town of Cotton Valley, 584 So. 2d 1199 (La. App. 2d Cir.) (statute prohibiting
a reduction of police chief's compensation during term for which he is elected did not
prevent board from reducing salary for a term for which chief had been elected but had
not yet begun to serve), writ denied, 589 So. 2d 1057 (1991).
47. West Cent. La. Entertainment, Inc. v. City of Leesville, 594 So. 2d 973 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1992) (ordinance making it unlawful for holder of a city occupational retail
license to permit patrons of establishment to consume or to possess alcoholic beverages
did not violate due process or equal protection rights of holder of license, nor was it
unconstitutionally broad or vague); Flagship Ctr., Inc. v. City of New Orleans, 587 So.
2d 154 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991) (allowing cable television operators to hold bingo games
more often than operators who held games in buildings violated equal protection because
the statutory classification did not rationally relate to a legitimate governmental interest
in preventing bingo facilities from becoming gambling facilities); see also Louisiana Assoc.
Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Calcasieu Parish Sch. Bd., 586 So. 2d 1354 (La. 1991) (school
boards have no police power beyond that conferred by state statute).
48. See, e.g., Louisiana Power & Light Co. v. Parish Sch. Bd., 597 So. 2d 578 (La.
App. 5th Cir. 1992) (legislature did not suspend the exemptions to local sales taxes when
it suspended the exemptions from state sales taxes), writ denied, 604 So. 2d 1316 (1992);
Branton v. Webster Parish Sch. Bd., 596 So. 2d 840 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1992) (all voters,
not just property owners, were entitled to vote in a school district election authorizing
the issuance of general obligation bonds to be retired by an increase of the ad valorem
taxes on property situated in the district); Ryder Truck Rental, Inc. v. Schofield, 593 So.
2d 403 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991) (statute permitting cities to impose-a sales tax as permitted
by state law did not apply to the city-parish government); Exxon Corp. v. Schofield, 583
So. 2d 1195 (La. App. 1st Cir.) (neither raw material ultimately used in the manufacture
of product nor nonreturnable packaging material used to ship product to a customer were
subject to sales tax), writ denied, 588 So. 2d 103 (1991); Abraham v. Carter, 580 So.
2d 485 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991) (taxpayer claims that assessments were unequal, not
uniform, and incorrect relative to similarly situated property were "correctness" challenges
that had to be first presented in administrative proceedings).
49. See, e.g., Roland Constr. Co. v. City of Alexandria, 591 So. 2d 808 (La. App.




The Voting Rights Act52 serves as a significant restraint on state or
local changes to "any voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or
standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting." 53 Section 2
forbids any practices that deny or abridge the right to vote on account
of race or color.5 4 Section 5 imposes a special procedural hurdle on
certain state and local governments,55 most of which are located in the
city's subsequent award of the contract and completion of the project); Schaff Bros.
Contractors, Inc. v. Jefferson Parish Sch. Bd., 591 So. 2d 420 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1991)
(school board could reject low bid because bidder failed to attend a mandatory pre-bid
meeting), writ denied, 592 So. 2d 1336 (1992); South Lafourche Metal Bldgs., Inc. v.
Grand Isle Fire Dep't, 582 So. 2d 970 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1991) (unsuccessful bidder
could not maintain a damage action when it failed to seek injunctive relief against award
of contract to successful bidder); Hartman Enters., Inc. v. Ascension-St. James Airport
& Transp. Auth., 582 So. 2d 198 (La. App. 1st Cir.) (unsuccessful bidder waived its
claim against the public body by failing to take diligent legal action to prevent the award
of the contract), writ denied, 582 So. 2d 195 (1991); City of Sulphur v. Southern Builders,
Inc., 579 So. 2d 1207 (La. App. 3d Cir.) (city was not entitled to have contract declared
null and void on the ground that contractor committed to complete the work in fourteen
months even though the contractor knew that the job would take longer), writ denied,
587 So. 2d 699 (1991); cf. Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. State, 596 So. 2d 822 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1991) (state's cancellation of contract for insurance was null and void where
state failed to follow the requirements of the Procurement Code), writ denied, 600 So.
2d 641 (1992).
50. State ex rel. Guste v. Nicholls College Found., 592 So. 2d 419 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1991) (although foundation was a private corporation, its records pertaining to public
funds which it received were subject to inspection), writ denied, 593 So. 2d 651 (1992);
Norris v. Monroe City Sch. Bd., 580 So. 2d 425 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1991) ("discussion
of litigation" exception to law applied even though no litigation was pending where school
board was subject to a court desegregation decree and the board's attorney felt that some
zoning changes being discussed in the meeting would require a modification of the-decree).
A 1992 statute appears to have codified the result in Guste. See 1992 La. Acts No. 1055,
enacting La. R.S. 17:3390.
51. Copsey v. Baer, 593 So. 2d 685 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1991) (legislative privileges
and immunities clause of state constitution prevailed over the right of the public to
examine legislative records under the Public Records Law), writ denied, 594 So. 2d 876
(1992); Treadway v. Jones, 583 So. 2d 119 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1991) (written management
proposals submitted to city housing authority director were public records subject to
disclosure under state law, and a draft confidentiality policy of the federal Department
of Housing and Urban Development was insufficient to preempt state law).
52. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-73p (1988). Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment grants
Congress the power to enact the Voting Rights Act. See City of Rome v. United States,
446 U.S. 156, 173-79, 100 S. Ct. 1548, 1559-62 (1980); South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U.S. 301, 308-15, 86 S. Ct. 803, 808-11 (1966).
53. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973(a), 1973c (1988).
54. Id. § 1973.
55. Id. § 1973b(b). On the applicability of Section 5 to local governments, see City
of Rome, 446 U.S. at 162-69, 100 S. Ct. at 1554-57; United States v. Board of Comm'rs,
435 U.S. 110, 126-29, 98 S. Ct. 965, 976-78 (1978).
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South.5 6 No jurisdiction covered by Section 5 may impose a change wiih
respect to voting unless the Justice Department "preclears" the change
as nondiscriminatory or the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia determines that the change is not discriminatory. 7 Unlike
Section 1 of the Fifteenth Amendment"8 or the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment,59 the Voting Rights Act does not require
proof of discriminatory intent; discriminatory "results" or "impacts"
are sufficient to establish a violation of Section 2 or Section 5. 0
The definition of what constitutes a "standard, practice, or procedure
with respect to voting" is obviously crucial to determining the reach of
the Act. Beginning with the 1969 decision in Allen v. State Board of
Elections,61 the Supreme Court defined the term broadly to achieve the
statute's remedial purposes. Allen itself held that rules regarding qual-
ifications of candidates, as well as decisions relating to what offices
would be elected, fall within the preclearance requirement of Section
5.62 Subsequent decisions have required preclearance for changes relating
to filing deadlines, 63 the location of polling places, 64 substitution of at-
large for ward elections, 6 the boundaries of voting districts, 6 rules
requiring members of a board of education to take an unpaid leave of
absence while campaigning for office, 67 the number of persons who
served on an elected council, 68 and replacement of appointed officials
with elected officials.6 9
56. See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 317-19, 86 S. Ct. at 813.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988).
58. See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 100 S. Ct. 1490 (1980).
59. See, e.g., Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S. Ct. 2040
(1976); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 93 S. Ct. 2686 (1973).
60. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973, 1973c (1988); see Chisom v. Roemer, Ill S. Ct. 2354, 2363
(1991); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 172, 100 S. Ct. 1548, 1559 (1980).
61. 393 U.S. 544, 89 S. Ct. 817 (1969).
62. The cases that were consolidated in Allen applied the preclearance requirement
to changes from single-district to at-large voting, id. at 550, 89 S. Ct. at 823; changes
that substituted appointed for elected offices; id. at 550-51, 89 S. Ct. at 823-24; special
conditions imposed on independent candidates running in general elections, id. at 551, 89
S. Ct. at 824; and procedures for casting write-in ballots. Id. at 570-71, 89 S. Ct. at
834.
63. NAACP v. Hampton County Election Comm'n, 470 U.S. 166, 105 S. Ct. 1128
(1985); Hadnott v. Amos, 394 U.S. 358, 89 S. Ct. 1101 (1969).
64. Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 91 S. Ct. 431 (1971).
65. Id.
66. City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462, 107 S. Ct. 794 (1987);
City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 100 S. Ct. 1548 (1980); City of Richmond
v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 95 S. Ct. 2296 (1975); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S.
379, 91 S. Ct. 431 (1971).
67. Dougherty County Bd. of Educ. v. White, 439 U.S. 32, 99 S. Ct. 368 (1978).
68. City of Lockhart v. United States, 460 U.S. 125, 103 S. Ct. 998 (1983).
69. McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236, 104 S. Ct. 1037 (1984).
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A 1992 decision limited this expansive definition of the reach of
the Act. Presley v. Etowah County Commission 0 refused to extend the
preclearance requirement of Section 5 to cover local ordinances that
altered the powers of county commissioners.
Presley was actually a consolidation of two cases from Alabama.
In each case, the county commission reduced the powers of individual
commissioners regarding the spending of funds for road construction
and maintenance. In one case, the change occurred immediately after
the first black commissioner was elected; in the other, the change came
after the passage of the Voting Rights Act but before modification to
the mechanism for electing commissioners permitted the election of the
first black commissioner.
When the Voting Rights Act was passed, Etowah County had a
five-member commission. County-wide elections selected a commission
chairman, as well as a commissioner for each road district. Each district
commissioner had to reside in the district the commissioner served, and
the district commissioner supervised the road district's shop, equipment,
and road crew. Although the commission voted as a body on how
money should be divided among the districts, the district commissioner
controlled spending priorities within the district after the funds were
divided.
Under a consent decree, the county changed to a six-member com-
mission. 71 Ultimately, each member was to be elected from a different
district. During a transition period, two commissioners were elected to
join the four district commissioners who were serving when the consent
decree went. into effect. Following the election of the new commissioners
(including the county's first black commissioner), the commission enacted
two resolutions. The first allowed the holdover commissioners to continue
to supervise the four road shops in the county and gave them joint
responsibility for overseeing the repair, maintenance, and improvement
of all county roads. The new commissioners were given supervisory
responsibility for the county's courthouse and engineering department.
The second resolution transferred from the individual district commis-
sioners to the entire commission responsibility for determining how road
funds were to be spent. 72
Russell County had a three-member commission, but it was expanded
to five commissioners by a 1972 court order. After the expansion of
the commission, the three rural commissioners had individual authority
over road and bridge repair and construction within their districts. A
commissioner was subsequently indicted for corruption with respect to
70. 112 S. Ct. 820 (1992).
71. The Justice Department precleared the changes of the consent decree. Id. at 825.
72. Id. at 825-26.
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road operations in the county, and, in 1979, the commission modified
the way that those operations were handled. The 1979 resolution trans-
ferred control over most road matters to the county engineer, "an official
appointed by the entire commission and responsible to it." A 1985
consent decree enlarged the Russell County commission to seven mem-
bers, all of whom were elected in district elections. Following this change,
the county's first black commissioners were elected. 3
The plaintiffs in Presley argued that the county commissions had
violated Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act by failing to submit the
resolutions altering the powers of the individual commissioners to the
Justice Department for preclearance. The district court held that pre-
clearance was required for the resolution assigning road supervision
responsibility to the holdover commissioners in Etowah County, but not
for the other two resolutions. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that
preclearance was also required for the resolution transferring control
over Etowah County roads to the entire commission and for the res-
olution assigning responsibility for road operations in Russell County
to the county engineer.
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court.74
Because the defendants did not appeal the order mandating preclearance
73. Id. at 826-27.
74. Three justices dissented in Presley. Id. at 832 (Stevens, J., dissenting joined by
White, J., and Blackmun, J.). Justice Stevens began his analysis with the premise that
"a few pages of history are far more illuminating than volumes of logic and hours of
speculation about hypothetical line-drawing problems." In his view, the relevant historical
event was the election in 1986 of black commissioners in two counties "with long histories
of white-dominated political processes." Id. at 832-33.
The dissent emphasized that its approach was consistent with past administrative and
judicial practices. The Attorney General had routinely processed preclearance requests
involving transfers of decisionmaking powers, and the federal courts had "uniformly"
accepted the Attorney General's interpretation that preclearance was required when transfers
"had a potential for discrimination against minority voters." In light of this background,
Justice Stevens dismissed the majority's concern with the disruptive effect of the Attorney
General's interpretation on the federal system as "simply hyperbole." Id. at 833-34.
Ultimately, however, Justice Stevens found it unnecessary to decide whether the
Attorney General's interpretation was correct. Because "a narrower basis for a decision"
was available in each case, he argued that the cases should be decided without reaching
the broader grounds urged by the federal government. Id. at 834.
In Justice Stevens' view, the sympathetic interpretation of Section 5 that had been
adopted in Allen and its progeny was designed to keep the covered jurisdictions from
responding "to the increase in the number of black registered voters by means that
prevented the newly registered minority voters from having a proportionate impact on
the political process." Id. at 835. Although transfers of decisionmaking authority "to an
appointed official, or to a group . . . controlled by the majority" were not prevalent
when the Voting Rights Act was initially passed, it had "been an active concern of the
Attorney General since 1976." Moreover, this concern was justified. "[Alt least in its
most blatant form," these types of changes were "indistinguishable from, and just as
19931
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
for the Etowah County ordinance assigning responsibility for road su-
pervision, the Court did not consider that issue. However, it did hold
that preclearance was not required for either of the other two resolutions.
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion began its analysis with a rhe-
torical reaffirmation of Allen and its rationale as "sound." But even
as he reemphasized "that the scope of § 5 is expansive within its sphere
of operation," Justice Kennedy identified an important limitation to
that sphere: "[C]ases since Allen reveal a consistent requirement that
changes subject to § 5 pertain only to voting." Although the first three
practices in Allen involved "election procedures" and the fourth involved
"substantive changes," a common factor united all four. Each had "a
direct relation to voting and the election process. ' 75
In explaining how Allen and subsequent cases applied this "consistent
requirement," Justice Kennedy divided the cases into four "typologies":
those that involved "the manner of voting," those that established
"candidacy requirements and qualifications," those that changed "the
composition of the electorate that may vote for candidates for a given
office," and those that involved "the creation or abolition of an elective
office." Although he disavowed any implication "that the four typologies
exhaust the statute's coverage," he did assert that all of the post-Allen
cases fell "within one of [these] four factual contexts presented in the
Allen cases." Moreover, he used the typologies as the standard for
evaluating the resolutions of the Alabama county commissions. Because
unacceptable as, gerrymandering boundary lines or switching elections from a district to
an at-large basis." Id. at 838.
Under Justice Stevens' approach, the Etowah County ordinances presented the clearest
case for requiring preclearance. Not only did they substantially reduce the powers of
individual commissioners, but they were only adopted after changes occurred that made
possible the election of the county's first black commissioner. As Justice Stevens noted
with understatement, these circumstances were "suggestive of the potential for discrimi-
nation." Id. at 839 (quoting Dougherty County Bd. of Educ. v. White, 439 U.S. 32, 42,
99 S. Ct. 368, 374 (1978)). At a minimum, he urged a test that would require preclearance
for any "reallocation of decisionmaking authority of an elective office that is taken (1)
after the 'ictory of a black candidate, and (2) after the entry of a consent decree designed
to give black voters an opportunity to have representation on an elective body." Id.
The need for preclearance of the Russell County ordinance was not so obvious
because it was adopted before the institution of the electoral changes that resulted in the
election of black commissioners. Nonetheless, Justice Stevens would have "require[d]
preclearance in this case as well." In his view, the "proper test" focuses on the potential
for discrimination. Previous cases had required preclearance for "[c]hanges from district
voting to at-large voting, the gerrymandering of district boundary lines, and the replacement
of an elected official with an appointed official" because they "all share[d] the char-
acteristic of enhancing the power of the majority over a segment of the political com-
munity." By reallocating power from "an elected district representative to an official . ..
controlled by the majority," the Russell County ordinance had the same "potential for
discrimination." Therefore, preclearance should be required for it as well. Id. at 840.
75. Id. at 828-29.
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neither of the resolutions came within any of the Allen typologies, he
concluded that Section 5 did not require that they be precleared. 6
According to Justice Kennedy, the Etowah County resolution was
not sufficiently related to voting to require preclearance because it "con-
cern[ed] the internal operations of an elected body." Thus, it did not
fit within any of the four categories recognized by Allen and its progeny.
[The resolution] has no connection to voting procedures: It does
not affect the manner of holding elections, it alters or imposes
no candidacy qualifications or requirements, and it leaves un-
disturbed the composition of the electorate. It also has no bearing
on the substance of voting power, for it does not increase or
diminish the number of officials for whom the electorate may
vote.
77
The plaintiffs argued that the resolution affected the voting power of
the electorate that chose the commissioners because it reduced the historic
powers of the commissioners that were being elected. Justice Kennedy,
however, rejected that argument because it "would work an uncon-
strained expansion" of the coverage of Section 5. Neither the plaintiffs
nor the federal government offered "a workable standard for distin-
guishing between changes in rules governing voting and changes in the
routine organization and functioning of government." Without such a
standard, the Act would "subject all or ... most decisions of govern-
ment in covered jurisdictions to federal supervision," a result that no
one claimed was intended by the Congress that passed the Voting Rights
Act. To avoid this rule, the majority opinion declared that "[c]hanges
which affect only the distribution of power among officials are not
subject" to Section 5 because they "have no direct relation to, or impact
on, voting." '78
The majority reached a similar conclusion regarding the Russell
County resolution that transferred control over most road operations to
the county engineer, an appointed official. The plaintiffs argued that
the change fell within the Allen rule requiring preclearance for changes
that make elective positions appointive, but Justice Kennedy rejected
that argument on the ground that it was based on a misunderstanding
of the prior decisions regarding changes in elective offices. Those de-
cisions required preclearance not because the change produced "a change
in the relative authority of various governmental officials, but because
it changed an elective office to an appointive one." Again, Justice
Kennedy emphasized the practical impact of requiring preclearance for
76. Id.
77. Id. at 829.
78. Id. at 829-30.
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all redistributions of governmental powers that are delegated to appointed
officials. It is, he asserted, "a routine part of governmental adminis-
tration for appointive positions to be created or eliminated and for their
powers to be altered." Although the Presley opinion conceded that some
extreme delegations of power to appointed officials might "rise to the
level of a de facto replacement of an elective office," Justice Kennedy
noted that the Russell County ordinance did not have that effect because
the county commission "retains substantial authority, including the power
to appoint the county engineer and to set his or her budget."1
79
The majority opinion in Presley concluded with an explanation of
why the Court chose to reject the Attorney General's administrative
construction of Section 5, which would have required preclearance.
Acknowledging that the construction of the Attorney General is entitled
to "deference" when the statutory language is subject to differing in-
terpretation, Justice Kennedy emphasized that "[d]eference does not
mean acquiescence" when the administrative construction conflicts with
the intent of Congress. Because the statutory language was not "am-
biguous as to the question whether § 5 extends beyond changes in rules
governing voting," the Court followed the statutory language rather than
the Attorney General's interpretation. 0
The doctrinal impact of Presley may be modest. The Court reaf-
firmed that the Voting Rights Act should be construed broadly to achieve
its remedial purpose. More specifically, the Presley opinion merely iden-
tified a principle that limits prior decisions; it did not repudiate them.
Although arguments in future cases are likely to be channeled to the
four "typologies" that Justice Kennedy identified, a Court that was
more sympathetic to voting rights claims could rely on his assertion that
the list of typologies was not exclusive and expand the list.
Practically speaking, Presley's impact is likely to be more substantial.
Presley apparently exempts from preclearance actions for which pre-
clearance has routinely been sought in the past,8" and the refusal to
defer to the Attorney General's construction of the Act is likely to
encourage future judicial challenges with respect to the scope of the
Act's coverage. Furthermore, because Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act uses identical language to define its scope, Presley might also limit
that section's applicability as well. Perhaps most importantly, Presley
abandons the realistic analysis that has guided prior decisions interpreting
the Voting Rights Act. The limiting principle that Presley articulates is
formal rather than realistic. It focuses on the proper characterization
of the change that is being challenged rather than on how the change
79. Id. at 830-31.
80. Id. at 831-32.
81. See id. at 833-34 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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impacts the ability of blacks and other minorities to participate in the
electoral process.
Justice Kennedy gave three reasons for his decision: the lack of
judicial precedents subjecting changes in the authority of elected officials
to preclearance, the failure of the plaintiffs or the government to identify
a limiting principle if changes in governmental powers are covered, and
the practical impact of requiring preclearance for these types of gov-
ernmental actions. None of the three is persuasive.
The Court's niggardly reading of its own precedents is inconsistent
with the basic premise of Allen and its progeny that the Voting Rights
Act covers all changes that deny minority citizens an effective electoral
choice. As Justice Stevens points out in dissent," the interference is
clearest in the case of the Etowah County ordinance. The "principal
function [of county commissions in Alabama] is to supervise and [to]
control the maintenance, repair, and construction of the county roads."' 3
Until Etowah County elected its first black commissioner, each district
commissioner controlled the expenditure of road funds within his or her
district. As soon as black voters were able to elect a black commissioner
to represent them, the holdover white commissioners excluded him from
participation in the principal function of the commission14 and denied
him the ability to see that a fair share of the road funds were used to
benefit his constituents. The change in Russell County lacked the tem-
poral connection with the election of the first black commissioner, but
the ultimate impact was the same. Even if the blacks in a district chose
a commissioner to represent their interest, the single commissioner no
longer had the historic power to spend funds on the road projects the
commissioner favors.
The refusal to defer to the Attorney General's interpretation of the
Act is also inconsistent with the Court's precedents. 5 Justice Kennedy's
response that the Act covers only "change[s] in ... rule[s] governing
voting" 86 fails to justify the refusal to follow the administrative inter-
pretation. The Act does not indicate whether the change must "govern"
voting in a formal or a practical sense. In fact, the Attorney General's
practical construction of the Act comports with the Act's emphasis on
82. Id. at 834 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 824.
84. Although the district court required preclearance of this resolution, id. at 826,
preclearance does not seem to be required under the Supreme Court's test. See id. at
839-40 n.24 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
85. See, e.g., NAACP v. Hampton County Election Comm'n, 470 U.S. 166, 178-
79, 105 S. Ct. 1128, 1135-36 (1985); United States v. Board of Comm'rs, 435 U.S. 110,
131, 98 S. Ct. 965, 979 (1978).
86. Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 820, 832 (1992).
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eliminating all barriers that exclude protected minorities from meaningful
participation in the electoral process, regardless of whether the changes
were animated by any discriminatory purpose. s7
The Court's claim that manageable standards were unavailable is
equally unpersuasive. The government's suggestion that budgetary mat-
ters differ from other types of legislative activities accords with the
distinction between appropriations and legislation that the Court has
accepted in other contexts."s Similarly, the dissent of Justice Stevens
shows that a viable limitation could focus on the context in which the
change occurs.8 9 Indeed, the Court did not even need to adopt the
narrow approach it chose in order to achieve the result it sought. The
lower court had not required preclearance for either resolution even
though its analysis focused on the practical impact of protected minorities
to participate in the electoral process.9
The Court's emphasis on the practical impact of requiring preclear-
ance is an insubstantial argument. Not only was the agency charged
with administering the Act unconcerned with the burden, but changes
for which preclearance would not now be required had apparently been
routinely precleared in the past.9'
An unstated, but perhaps more valid, concern may have animated
the Court-the fear that preclearance will be a disincentive to reform
efforts. The Russell County resolution illustrates the problem most graph-
ically. Apparently in response to a scandal in the handling of road
funds, the county commission transferred the powers to the appointed
county engineer more than a decade before the commission was restruc-
tured in a way that permitted the election of a black commissioner.
Although the fear of discouraging reform is understandable, it overstates
the impact of the Voting Rights Act. The Act does not forbid all
changes regarding voting practices, just those that have a dispropor-
tionate impact on voters because of their race or color. Arguably, the
87. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
88. See, e.g., Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 359-62, 99 S. Ct. 2335, 2341-
43 (1979).
89. See Presley, 112 S. Ct. at 840 (Stevens, J., dissenting):
Changes from district voting to at-large voting, the gerrymandering of district
boundary lines, and the replacement of an elected official with an appointed
official, all share the characteristic of enhancing the power of the majority over
a segment of the political community that might otherwise be adequately rep-
resented. A resolution that reallocates decisionmaking power by transferring
authority from an elected district representative to an official, or a group,
controlled by the majority, has the same potential for discrimination against
the constituents in the disadvantaged districts.
90. Id. at 831 (majority opinion citing district court's test of whether the change
"transfer[red] power among officials answerable to different constituencies").
91. Id. at 833-34 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Russell County ordinance would satisfy that requirement. 92 In any event,
focusing reform efforts on proposals that permit effective minority par-
ticipation in government seems fully consistent with the goal of the
Voting Rights Act.
Ultimately, Presley reflects the Supreme Court's continuing hostility
towards efforts to protect minorities from the discriminatory impacts of
governmental actions, as well as from governmental actions whose dis-
criminatory purpose can be proved. 93 The Court's decision may not be
the last word, however. Throughout the 1980s, the Supreme Court
narrowly construed various civil rights laws only to have Congress amend
the statutes to overrule the Court's interpretation. 94 Thus, the battle
over the scope of the Voting Rights Act may shift back to Congress
in a pattern that is likely to recur so long as the judicial and legislative
branches remain divided over the extent to which the federal government
should protect the rights of minorities.
STATE-LOCAL RELATIONS
For parishes and municipalities, 9 the Louisiana Constitution sub-
stantially modifies the traditional "state creature concept."' 9 Any parish
or municipality can adopt a home rule charter that allows it to exercise
92. Because the Russell County ordinance was adopted before the electoral change
-that made it possible to elect a black commissioner, it does not appear to have been
designed to discriminate against blacks. Without evidence that the commission was less
favorable to blacks than individual commissioners at that time, the change arguably had
no adverse impact on the ability of black voters to participate effectively, in the political
process.
93. See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
94. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1074-75 (1991), rev'g Wards
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989); Pub. L. No. 100-
259, § 3, 102 Stat. 28 (1988), rev'g Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 104 S. Ct.
1211 (1984); Pub. L. No. 97-205, § 3, 96 Stat. 134 (1982), rev'g City of Mobile v. Bolden,
446 U.S. 55, 100 S. Ct. 1490 (1980).
95. See La. Const. art. VI, § 44 (defining "local governmental subdivision" to include
any parish or municipality and "political subdivision" to include parishes and municipalities
as well as "any other unit of local government, including a school board and a special
district, authorized by law to perform governmental functions"). For further explanations
of the powers granted to local governments under the 1974 constitution, see Kenneth M.
Murchison, Local Government Law, Developments in the Law, 1983-1984, 45 La. L. Rev.
357, 379-80 (1984); Kenneth M. Murchison, Local Government Law, Developments in the
Law, 1982-1983, 44 La. L. Rev. 373, 389-90 (1983); Kenneth M. Murchison, Local
Government Law, Developments in the Law, 1980-1981, 42 La. L. Rev. 564, 573-74
(1982); Murchison, 1979-1980 Developments, supra note 18, at 485-86 (1981); Murchison,
1977-1978 Developments, supra note 45, at 851-52.
96. For cases using the traditional approach, see Pyle v. City of Shreveport, 215 La.
257, 263, 40 So. 2d 235, 238 (1948); Union Sulphur Co. v. Parish of Calcasieu, 153 La.
857, 861, 96 So. 787, 788 (1923).
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any powers not inconsistent with the constitution or denied by general
law. 97 Even when a parish or municipality lacks a home rule charter,
the local electorate can authorize the governing body to exercise any
power not inconsistent with the constitution or denied by general law. 9
The traditional rules still govern the powers of other types of local
governments. They have only those powers conferred by the constitution
or statute. 99 Moreover, that limitation precludes them from exercising
any power that is inconsistent with general state law.' °°
A further constitutional rule limits the powers of all local govern-
ments. Notwithstanding any of the provisions of the local government
article to the constitution, "the police power of the state shall never
be abridged."'' °
Although school boards have a special status under Louisiana law,
their powers are defined by the traditional state creature concept. The
Louisiana Constitution requires the establishment of a school board in
every parish, but the legislature is responsible for creating the school
boards and for enacting laws affecting them. 0 2 A school board has no
inherent powers; it may only exercise those expressly delegated by the
legislature and those implied powers that are necessary to implement its
policies or to fulfill its duties. 103
Modern decisions have been fairly generous in implying powers for
the school board. For example, the courts of appeal have implied powers
to bargain with teacher's unions,' °4 to arrange for garbage disposal, 05
and to determine whether a teacher is entitled to a grant of sabbatical
leave.' °6 Nonetheless, the need for legislative authorization remains. The
Louisiana Supreme Court refused to allow a school board to call a
referendum to determine whether it should recognize and bargain with
97. La. Const. art. VI, §§ 4, 5.
98. Id. § 7.
99. Id. § 19 (authorizing the legislature to create "special districts, boards, agencies,
and commissions" and to confer such powers on them as the legislature deems fit).
100. See, e.g., Rollins Envtl. Serv. of La., Inc. v. Iberville Parish Police Jury, 371
So. 2d 1127, 1131 (La. 1979); City of Minden v. David Bros. Drug Co., 195 La. 791,
800, 197 So. 505, 508 (1940).
101. La. Const. art. VI, § 9(B).
102. Id. §§ 9(A), 10(A).
103. St. John the Baptist Parish Ass'n of Educators v. Brown, 465 So. 2d 674, 676
(La. 1985).
104. Louisiana Teachers Ass'n v. Orleans Parish Sch. Bd., 303 So. 2d 564 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1974), writ denied, 305 So. 2d 541 (1975).
105. Disposal Sys., Inc. v. Calcasieu Parish Sch. Bd., 243 So. 2d 915 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1971).
106. Shaw v. Caddo Parish Sch. Bd., 347 So. 2d 39 (La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied,
350 So. 2d 676 (1977).
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a teacher's union because it was not sufficiently related to any power
delegated by the legislature. 0 7
A 1991 decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court once again in-
validated a school board's action as beyond its powers. Louisiana As-
sociated General Contractors, Inc. v. Calcasieu Parish School Board'0
held that a school board could not require that contracts awarded on
its public works projects contain a prevailing wage rate provision.
The legislature has granted school boards the power to erect "school
houses."' ° A separate statute, the Public Bid Law,"10 requires school
boards"' to award contracts for most public works projects "to the
lowest responsible bidder" who bids in accordance with "the contracts,
plans, and specifications as advertised." '" 2 Prior to 1988, a third law
required state contracts to include a requirement that the contractor pay
its workers the "prevailing wage" as determined by the state department
of labor." 3 The prevailing wage law also authorized local governments
to impose prevailing wage requirements in their contracts so long as the
local requirements were "identical" to the state provision.1"4
In 1988, the legislature repealed the prevailing wage law, including
the authorization for local governments to impose similar requirements." 5
Despite the repeal of the state statute, the Calcasieu Parish School Board
included a prevailing wage requirement in the advertisements for bids
on its public works contracts. The plaintiffs challenged the legality of
the requirement, and the supreme court held that the school board
lacked the power to require contractors to pay prevailing wages.
The school board argued that the authority to impose the prevailing
wage requirement could be implied from the power to erect school
houses. The supreme court, however, found the implied authority "more
complicated" because the "school board's action [also] implicates an-
other legislative statute." It thus redefined the "precise issue for our
determination" as "whether the School Board's specification requiring
contractors to agree to pay a predetermined prevailing wage is a spec-
ification which the School Board is authorized to insert in contracts"
107. St. John the Baptist, 465 So. 2d 674.
108. 586 So. 2d 1354 (La. 1991). Before reaching the authority issue, the court dismissed
two procedural objections to reaching the merits. First, it held that the contractors had
standing to challenge the prevailing wage requirements. Id. at 1357-59. Second, the court
ruled that the contractors did not have to show irreparable injury to obtain an injunction.
Id. at 1359-60.
109. La. R.S. 17:81G (1992 Supp.).
110. La. R.S. 38:2211-2226 (1989 & Supp. 1992).
111. La. R.S. 38:2211(A)(1) (1989 & Supp. 1992).
112. La. R.S. 38:2212(A)(l)(a) (1989 & Supp. 1992).
113. La. R.S. 38:2301 (1968), repealed by 1988 La. Acts No. 90, § I.
114. La. R.S. 38:2301(M) (1968), repealed by 1988 La. Acts No. 90, § I.
115. 1988 La. Acts No. 90, § 1.
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that, under the Public Bid Law, "must be let to the 'lowest responsible
bidder.""116
Having shifted the focus of its statutory interpretation from the law
enumerating school board powers to the Public Bid Law, a four-to-
three majority of the supreme court found the prevailing wage require-
ment incompatible with the bid law.117 Central to this holding was the
116. Louisiana Assoc. Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Calcasieu Parish Sch. Bd., 586 So.
2d 1354, 1360-62 (La. 1991).
117. Justice Watson concurred. Id. at 1369 (Watson, J., concurring). Chief Justice
Calogero and Justice Dennis prepared dissenting opinions. Id. at 1369 (Calogero, C.J.,
dissenting); id. at 1370 (Dennis, J., dissenting). Justice Marcus dissented without opinion.
Id. at 1369.
Justice Watson concurred on very narrow grounds that focused on the school board's
reliance on prevailing wage determinations by the state department of labor. He argued
that the school board could "not require bidders on public works projects to agree to
pay the 'prevailing wage' because no "prevailing wage" existed in Louisiana after the
legislature passed the 1988 repeal statute. After the repeal, the department of labor was
"no longer authorized to make such wage determinations." Thus, the school board lacked
the power to "adopt something which does not exist as a matter of law" until "the
legislature breathes new life into the 'prevailing wage' concept." Id. at 1369 (Watson,
J., concurring).
The dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Calogero disagreed with the majority's con-
clusion because it rejected the claim that the Public Bid Law was designed to eliminate
excessive costs. According to the chief justice, the purpose of the statute was "to protect
against contracts entered into because of favoritism, with its often times exorbitant and
extortionate prices." Although a prevailing wage provision might increase the cost of a
contract, "prevailing wage rates are ... the antithesis of exorbitant and extortionate
pricing in that they reflect the going rate for properly performed services." Since the
prevailing wage requirement did not conflict with the Public Bid Law, Chief Justice
Calogero concluded that it was "incidental" to the board's power "to erect school
buildings." Id. at 1369 (Calogero, C.J., dissenting).
The chief justice also challenged the majority's implicit suggestion that repeal of the
state's prevailing wage law in 1988 reflected a legislative determination to preclude local
governments from using prevailing wage requirements. The state prevailing wage require-
ment was mandatory for projects funded by state funds. Thus, the authorization for local
governments to use prevailing wage provisions for locally funded projects was designed
"to insure that the autonomy of political subdivisions writing bid specifications would
not be infringed upon by the enactment of a mandatory prevailing wage law applying to
the State." Since this legislation merely continued the preexisting power of local govern-
ments, repeal of the state prevailing wage law did "not remove local agencies' authority
to require a prevailing wage specification." Id. at 1370 (Calogero, C.J., dissenting).
Justice Dennis' dissenting opinion chastised the majority for deciding "what the law
ought to be instead of applying the statute enacted by the legislature." Reviewing the
historical development of the state's public bid statute, he criticized the majority's "con-
clusion that the public bid law, which was reenacted after, and coexisted for a time with,
the prevailing wage law, was intended all along by the legislature to outlaw prevailing
wage clauses." That conclusion was, he asserted, "a strained, implausible, and magical
construction...." Id. at 1370 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Not only
was this interpretation inconsistent with traditional rules of statutory construction, it also
conflicted with normal standards for reviewing bid specifications and unnecessarily restricted
the implied powers of local governments. Id. at 1370-73 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
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determination that the bid law had three distinct purposes: "to secure
free and unrestricted competition among bidders, to eliminate fraud and
favoritism, and to avoid undue or excessive costs.""'
Basically, Justice Cole's opinion for the majority found that the
prevailing wage requirement conflicted with the legislative directive to
let contracts to the lowest responsible bidder. By requiring the payment
of prevailing wages "as a prerequisite to bidding" on public works
contracts, the school board "disturb[ed] the careful balance achieved by
the legislature" with respect to the three purposes of the Public Bid
Law. Conceding that the authorization to erect school houses included
implicit authority to guarantee quality workmanship, Justice Cole none-
theless concluded that the bid law adequately protected that authority
by limiting contract awards to "responsible" bidders." 9
Relying on decisions of various federal and state courts that had
sustained prevailing wage requirements as permissible under public bid
laws, 120 the school board argued that the public bid law allowed it to
impose the prevailing wage requirement. The board contended that the
requirement was an appropriate exercise of the power to set bid spec-
ifications and of the power to determine whether a bidder was respon-
sible. The majority opinion rejected both contentions.
Justice Cole acknowledged that the public bid law did not set any
express limits on labor specifications. However, he found an implicit
limit by analogy to the limitations regarding specifications for products
and materials. Those limitations showed a "conscious effort on the part
of the legislature to assure uninhibited competitive bidding." They only
allowed the contracting government to limit specifications to ensure the
"quality of the product or material" and did not permit specification
of a minimum price.' 21
In rejecting the argument that the power to determine whether a
bidder was responsible authorized imposition of the prevailing wage
requirement, the court ruled that "responsibility" under the Public Bid
Law only has reference to the "quality, fitness, and capacity of the low
bidder to satisfactorily perform the proposed work." It does not include
118. Id. at 1362.
119. Id. at 1362-63.
120. Id. at 1366, n.19 (citing M.C. West, Inc. v. Lewis, 522 F. Supp. 338 (M.D.
Tenn. 1981); Central Ala. Paving, Inc. v. James, 499 F. Supp. 629 (M.D. Ala. 1980);
S.N. Nielson Co. v. Public Bldg. Comm'n of Chicago, 410 N.E.2d 40 (Ill. 1980); Southwest
Wash. Chapter Nat'l Elec. Contractors Ass'n v. Pierce County, 667 P.2d 1092 (Wash.
1983)). Instead, the Louisiana Supreme Court chose to rely on the decision of the Alabama
Supreme Court in Wallace v. Board of Educ. of Montgomery County, 197 So. 2d 428
(Ala. 1967). See id. at 1365.
121. Louisiana Assoc. Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Calcasieu Parish Sch. Bd., 586 So.
2d 1354, 1364-65 (La. 1991).
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the authority to judge the social responsibility of the bidder, especially
for school boards who have no "police power" beyond that delegated
by the state. 22
Justice Cole concluded his analysis by emphasizing the primacy of
state legislation. The Public Bid Law was "a valid exercise of the state
police power for the protection of the public," and the school boards
were bound by it.123 When the legislature wanted to grant local gov-
ernments discretion to prefer small businesses, state residents, and mi-
nority contractors, it had included special authorizations in the Public
Bid Law. It had included no such authorization for prevailing wages,
so the school board lacked authority to add such a requirement.1 24
The supreme court's decision may accord with legislative sentiment
in 1988. However, the court relied on a questionable construction of
the Public Bid Law to achieve its result. Moreover, imprecision in the
majority's analysis makes it difficult to anticipate the exact reach of
the court's opinion.
The basic premise of Justice Cole's opinion is sound. In deciding
whether a particular statute implicitly authorizes a local government to
act, courts may properly consider other statutes that bear on the power
under discussion. 25 Not only does this principle accord with the court's
prior decisions,' 26 it also reflects common sense. In deciding whether to
imply a power that the legislature has not expressly granted, looking at
other relevant statutes may assist the court in arriving at a sensible
construction that makes sense of the statutes as a whole. If the state
has not addressed a matter at all, the court should be more willing to
imply a local power; allowing the local government to act will avoid a
regulatory hiatus without conflicting with any state policy. Conversely,
if other statutes indicate that the matter is one for which the state has
made other provision, a court should be less willing to imply a legislative
authorization for local governments to establish a contrary rule.
Deciding which of these situations existed in Louisiana Associated
General Contractors is problematic in light of the 1988 repeal of the
state's prevailing wage law, including the authorization for local gov-
ernments to insert prevailing wage requirements in their contracts. Su-
perficially, that repeal suggests a legislative intention to forbid prevailing
122. Id. at 1366.
123. Id. at 1367.
124. Id. at 1368 (citing La. R.S. 38:2225.1, 2233, 2233.1, and 2233.2).
125. Id. at 1362 ("[Tihe question of a school board's implicit authority to act becomes
more complicated when, as in the present case, the school board's action implicates
another legislative statute.").
126. See, e.g., Rollins Envtl. Serv. of La., Inc. v. Iberville Parish Police Jury, 371
So. 2d 1127 (La. 1979); City of Minden v. David Bros. Drug Co. 195 La. 791, 197 So.
505 (1940).
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wages in public contracts, but closer analysis indicates that this superficial
impression may be incorrect. When the state enacted its prevailing wage
law, adding an authorization for local prevailing wage requirements was
prudent to preclude the argument that state law implicitly preempted
local supplementation and to provide for uniformity with respect to the
standard for determining prevailing wages. Repeal of the state law
eliminated the preemption argument and with it the need for express
legislative authority for local governments to impose (or to choose not
to impose) prevailing wage requirements. 27 Thus, the effect of the 1988
repeal was to reestablish the law as it existed prior to the enactment
of the prevailing wage law in 1968.
In resolving the implied authority issue, Justice Cole's opinion prop-
erly focused on the Public Bid Law rather than the 1988 repeal of the
state's prevailing wage law. However, to reach the conclusion that the
Public Bid Law forbids prevailing wage requirements required the ma-
jority to take two additional steps, and both were unwise.
First, the majority expanded the purpose of the Public Bid Law to
include avoiding "undue or excessive costs" as well as the traditional
concerns with encouraging competition and prohibiting favoritism. a2 This
expansion of purpose allowed the court to second guess the substance
of the contracting government's specifications by implying limits in
addition to those that the legislature imposed. Fortunately, the court
may confine the future impact of this expansion of purpose to the
prevailing wage requirements. Although the court's rationale would per-
mit challenges to any public contract on the ground that the expenditures
it authorizes are "excessive," the courts are likely to rely on the discretion
of the contracting entity' 9 to dismiss most claims summarily.
Second, the majority misstated the impact of a prevailing wage
requirement. Unlike subjective prequalification requirements, the pre-
vailing wage requirement does not stifle competition by excluding po-
tential bidders. Any contractor may choose to bid so long as the contractor
agrees to pay the prevailing wage. Some contractors may choose not to
bid because of the fear that paying prevailing wages on government
127. See Louisiana Assoc. Gen. Contractors, 586 So. 2d at 1370 (Calogero, C.J.,
dissenting).
128. Indeed, the quotation on which the court relies to establish the purpose of public
bid laws excludes the third purpose:
The purpose behind competitive bidding is: "[T]o provide for open and honest
competition in bidding for public contracts and to save the public harmless, as
well as the bidders themselves, from any kind of favoritism or fraud in its
varied forms:"
Id. at 1362 n.15 (quoting Board of Educ. of Chillicothe City Sch. Dist. v. Sever-Williams
Co., 258 N.E.2d 605, 610 (Ohio 1970)).
129. Louisiana Assoc. Gen. Contractors, 586 So. 2d at 1362-63 (citing Haughton
Elevator Div. v. State Div. of Admin., 367 So. 2d 1161 (La. 1979)).
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contracts would lead to demands for similar wages on other contracts.
But the decision as to whether to bid remains with the contractor, not
with a governmental entity.
Ultimately, Justice Cole's opinion seems to rest on the conclusion
that the prevailing wage requirement is "unnecessary" to protect the
local government's asserted interest in ensuring quality work. That con-
clusion may be accurate, but it is irrelevant to the question of whether
the legislature has foreclosed the use of prevailing wage requirements.
In light of the express provisions regarding limits on specifications
regarding materials and products, the lack of an express prohibition on
a prevailing wage requirements suggests that the court should have left
the matter to the political process.
One important aspect of Louisiana Associated General Contractors
remains ambiguous: Does the rationale of the court's opinion apply only
to those local governments, like school boards, that need legislative
authorization to act or does it also extend to parishes and municipalities?
As noted above, 30 parishes and municipalities may obtain their powers
from a home rule charter or a specific local election. They may not,
however, exercise any power denied by general law, nor may they abridge
the police powers of the state. To the extent that the problem in
Louisiana Associated General Contractors was the lack of authority,
parishes and municipalities can avoid the limitation that it imposes on
school boards. To the extent that the problem was a legislative prohi-
bition on local action or an interference with the state police power,
the rationale also precludes parishes and municipalities from imposing
prevailing wage requirements.
The close division of the court in Louisiana Associated General
Contractors and conflicting indications in the wording of the majority
opinion leave the ultimate reach of the decision uncertain. Justice Cole's
grounding of the decision in the inconsistency between the prevailing
wage requirement and the Public Bid Law'3 ' and his emphasis on the
bid law as an exercise of the state's police power '32 suggest a legislative
prohibition that applies to all local governments. However, other aspects
of the opinion emphasize the school board's need for legislative
authorization'33 and the board's lack of any "police power" independent
of legislative authorization.'34 Moreover, Justice Watson concurred on
very narrow grounds.' 35 If he were to join the dissenters, they could
form a majority that might take a narrow view of the holding.
130. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
131. Louisiana Assoc. Gen. Contractors, 586 So. 2d at 1362-64.
132. Id. at 1367.
133. Id. at 1360-61.
134. Id. at 1367.
135. Id. at 1369 (Watson, J., concurring); see supra note 117.
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LAND USE PLANNING
For most of the twentieth century, the United States Supreme Court
has recognized that governmental regulation can be sufficiently onerous
to be classified as a taking for which the Eminent Domain Clause 36
requires compensation. 37 In determining whether a taking has occurred,
most decisions have focused on the economic impact of the regulation
on the property being regulated. The Court itself has characterized the
decisions as involving "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries."'' 3 The
vagueness of the test is captured in these oft-quoted words of Justice
Holmes: "[W]hile property may be regulated to a certain extent, if
regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking."' 39
As early as 1926, the Supreme Court ruled that the government was
not required to compensate an owner every time a regulation eliminated
the most profitable use of a parcel,' 4° and modern decisions have ex-
panded the scope of regulatory authority.' 4' The Court has generally
accepted the government's definition of the property interest that is
being regulated. 42 In addition, the Court has upheld regulations that
reduce the value of property considerably so long as the regulations do
not interfere with the reasonable "investment-backed expectations" of
the owner, 43 which several recent cases have equated with denying the
136. U.S. Const. amend. V: "[Nior shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation."
137. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 107
S. Ct. 1232 (1987); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 98 S.
Ct. 2646 (1978); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 43 S. Ct. 158 (1922).
For an analysis of the Supreme Court's decision in Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n, see
Murchison, 1986-1987 Developments, supra note 20, at 315-22.
138. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893 (1992);
Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S. Ct. at 2659; Goldblatt v. Town of
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594, 82 S. Ct. 987, 990 (1962).
139. Pennsylvania Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 415, 43 S. Ct. at 160, quoted in Yee v.
City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1529 (1992).
140. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S. Ct. 114 (1926).
141. The Court has also emphasized the economic nature of property in defining what
constitutes a public purpose for which the government can take private property. See
Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 104 S. Ct. 2321 (1984) (broadening the
class of persons who own private property is a public purpose that justifies condemning
condominium units so that they can be resold to existing tenants).
142. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497,
107 S. Ct. 1232, 1248 (1987); Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 131, 98 S. Ct. at
2662-63; see generally Murchison, 1986-1987 Developments, supra note 20, at 309-10.
143. E.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1005, 104 S. Ct. 2862, 2874
(1984); Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83, 100 S. Ct. 2035, 2042
(1980); Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 124, 98 S. Ct. at 2659.
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owner "economically viable use" of the property being regulated.'"
However, when a regulation prevents any economically viable use of
the property, the government must compensate the owner. Even if the
regulation is subsequently repealed, the government must compensate
the owner for the loss suffered while the regulation remained in effect.' 45
Although most eminent domain decisions have focused on the ec-
onomic impact of the government's action, a few cases have ignored
the economic impact as irrelevant in determining whether a taking has
occurred. 46 On the one hand, the Court has treated certain interests as
indispensable aspects of property ownership. 47 Most importantly, the
right to exclude others has been recognized as an essential attribute of
the ownership of immovable property. When the government physically
invades'" (or authorizes third parties to invade 49) real estate, a taking
occurs even if the financial impact is minimal. On the other hand, the
court has also allowed the government to prohibit an owner from using
property in ways that harm the public without paying compensation
even when the economic impact of the regulation is very great. The
exact parameters of this "nuisance" exception have been uncertain, but
the Court has refused to order compensation in cases involving the
prohibition of the manufacture of intoxicating liquor,'50 the operation
144. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n, 480 U.S. at 499, 107 S. Ct. at 1249;
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 296, 101 S. Ct.
2352, 2370 (1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260, 100 S. Ct. 2138, 2141
(1980).
145. First Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304, 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987), analyzed in Murchison, 1986-1987 Developments, supra
note 20, at 311-13, 315-22; cf. Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S.
155, 101 S. Ct. 446 (1980) (state statute allowing county to have interest accruing on
interpleader fund deposited in the county court was a taking).
146. In addition to the two situations described in the text, the Court has also recognized
an "emergency" exception, which allows the government broad authority to respond to
emergencies without paying compensation. See, e.g., National Bd. of Young Men's Chris-
tian Ass'n v. United States, 395 U.S. 85, 89 S. Ct. 1511 (1969); United States v. Caltex,
344 U.S. 149, 73 S. Ct. 200 (1952).
147. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 107 S. Ct. 2076 (1987) (right to inherit); but see
Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 100 S. Ct. 318 (1979) (right to sell eagle feathers is not
an essential property interest the denial of which requires compensation).
148. E.g., Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84, 82 S. Ct. 531 (1962); Kimball
Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 69 S. Ct. 1434 (1949); United States v. Causby,
328 U.S. 256, 66 S. Ct. 1062 (1946).
149. E.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 102 S.
Ct. 3164 (1982); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 100 S. Ct. 383 (1979); see
also Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834, 107 S. Ct. 3141, 3147
(1987), analyzed in Murchison, 1986-1987 Developments, supra note 20, at 313-22.
150. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 8 S. Ct. 273 (1887).
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of a brickmill,'5 ' and the destruction of trees infested with cedar rust.'52
In the 1991-1992 term, the United States Supreme Court decided
two important taking cases. Both continued the Court's economic ap-
proach to eminent domain issues by narrowly construing the rules that
render the economic impact of regulations irrelevant. The first declined
to expand the category of intrusions that always constitute a taking. " '
The second narrowly defined the scope of the nuisance exception and,
especially, the legislature's power to say what constitutes a nuisance.5
4
Yee v. City of Escondido'" involved a challenge to a local ordinance
controlling the rent that could be charged for mobile home "pads."'1 6
The 1988 ordinance rolled rents back to 1986 levels and required city
council approval of future increases. At the time the city enacted its
ordinance, a state statute required owners of mobile home parks to
continue renting pads to the new owners of mobile homes that were
sold "in place," that is, that remained on the same pad when they are
sold. Although the statute limited the grounds for terminating particular
tenancies, it did not regulate the rents that the park owner could charge
or require the park owner to continue to use the property as a mobile
home park.'57
Most mobile homes are sold in place," 8 and neither the state law
nor the local ordinance regulated the prices for which mobile homes
could be sold. As a result, the combination of state and municipal laws
benefitted existing owners of mobile homes. Not only were their rents
controlled while they remained in their mobile homes, but they could
also capture the market value of the reduced pad rent when the mobile
homes were sold. Because the owner of the pad could not evict the
purchaser when the mobile home was sold, the seller could charge a
premium for the mobile home equal to the difference between the
controlled rent and its market value.
A 1988 Supreme Court decision effectively foreclosed most facial
challenges to rent control ordinances under the Eminent Domain Clause. 5 9
151. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 36 S. Ct. 143 (1915); cf. Goldblatt v.
Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 82 S. Ct. 987 (1962) (prohibition of gravel pit).
152. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 48 S. Ct. 246 (1928).
153. Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992).
154. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
155. 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992).
156. "A mobile home owner typically rents a plot of land, called a 'pad,' from the
owner of a mobile home park. The park owner provides private roads within the park,
common facilities such as washing machines or a swimming pool, and often utilities. The
mobile home owner often invests in site-specific improvements such as a driveway, steps,
walkways, porches, or landscaping." Id. at 1526.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 1526 (Mobile homes "are generally placed permanently in parks; once in
place, only about one in every hundred mobile homes is ever moved.").
159. Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 108 S. Ct. 849 (1988).
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So long as an ordinance provides a mechanism for future increases, the
Court ruled, it cannot be said to interfere with reasonable investment-
backed expectations by depriving the owner of economically viable use
of the property.
The owners of the mobile home pads in Yee claimed that the 1988
decision was inapplicable to the peculiar combination of state and local
laws to which they were subject.160 Most rent control laws benefitted a
class of persons whose members changed over time as old renters left
and new renters took their places. However the rent controls involved
in Yee benefitted a specific group of individuals-those who owned the
mobile homes that were parked on the pads. So long as they lived in
the mobile homes, they enjoyed lower rents. When they left the mobile
home park, they could collect the market value of the reduced rent by
charging a premium for the mobile home.
The Yee plaintiffs argued that conferring this benefit on existing
renters brought the case within the rule requiring compensation whenever
the government takes an essential property right for itself or transfers
the right to others.' 6' They contended that an owner's right to exclude
renters unless the owner is paid the market value of using the property
is a discrete property interest that could not be transferred to others
unless compensation is paid. Because the combination of laws applicable
to the Yee property "transferred a discrete interest in land-the right
to occupy the land indefinitely at a sub-market rent-from the park
owner to the mobile home owner," it was a taking regardless of impact
on the value of the property.1 62
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected the claim that the economic
impact was irrelevant to a determination of whether a taking had oc-
curred in Yee.163 According to the Court, the cases that required com-
160. The two courts of appeals that had considered the issue had reached conflicting
decisions. Compare Hall v. City of Santa Barbara, 833 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 940, 108 S. Ct. 1120 (1988), with Pinewood Estates of Mich. v. Barnegat
Township Leveling Bd., 898 F.2d 347 (3d Cir. 1990).
161. See supra notes 147-149 and accompanying text.
162. Yee v. City of Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1528 (1992).
163. In the Supreme Court, the Yee petitioners lodged two additional challenges against
the Escondido ordinance: that it "constituted] a denial of substantive due process and
a regulatory taking." The Court declined to review either issue, holding that neither was
properly before it: "The first was not raised or addressed below, and the second is not
fairly included in the question on which we granted certiorari." Id. at 1531.
The Court did address certain preliminary aspects of the second claim. First, the
Court held that the petitioners' "facial challenge" to the ordinance as a regulatory taking
was ripe even though the petitioners had not sought any increases under the ordinance.
Id. at 1531-32 (emphasis in original). Second, the Court held that, having raised a taking
claim, the petitioners could present all theories by which it might constitute a taking:
The "arguments that the ordinance constitutes a taking in two different ways, by physical
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pensation regardless of economic impact only applied where the
government "require[d] the landowner to submit to the physical occu-
pation of [the] land." By contrast, Yee was more like the cases allowing
the government to regulate the rent which a public utility could charge
for allowing others to use its utility pole. 64 The plaintiffs had not lost
the "right to exclude." They had "voluntarily rented land to mobile
home owners." Although the government regulated the rent which they
could charge and limited their authority to exclude individual renters,
it did not force them to rent their property for use as mobile home
pads. 6 ' The owners of the land remained free to convert the property
to other uses if those uses were more profitable than renting pads at
controlled rates.
The Court also rejected the broader theory upon which the plaintiffs
relied. Conceding that the statute and ordinances in Yee transferred
wealth from pad owners to mobile home owners, the Court refused to
rule that all wealth transfers to specific individuals amount to takings. 66
occupation and by regulation, are not separate claims. They are rather separate arguments
in support of a single claim-that the ordinance effects an unconstitutional taking."
Nonetheless, the Court refused to consider the regulatory taking argument because it was
not included in the question presented in the petition for certiorari. Id. at 1532-34 (relying
on Rule 14.1(a) of the Supreme Court Rules).
Justices Blackmun and Souter concurred in the judgment, and each prepared a brief
concurring statement. Justice Blackmun agreed that the ordinances passed by the city of
Escondido did not constitute a per se taking and that "the substantive due process and
regulatory taking claims [were] not properly raised" before the Supreme Court. However,
he preferred to avoid expressing an opinion as to "whether the regulatory taking claim
is or is not ripe, or which of petitioners' argument would or would not be relevant to
such a claim." Id. at 1534-35 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Similarly, Justice Souter joined
"the Court's opinion except for its references to the relevance and significance of peti-
tioners' allegations to a claim of regulatory taking." Id. at 1535 (Souter, J., concurring).
164. Id. at 1528 (citing FCC v. Florida Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 107 S. Ct. 1107
(1987)). See also id. at 1530.
165. Id. at 1528 ("The government effects a physical taking only where it requires
the landowner to submit to the physical occupation of his land.") Id. (emphasis in
original).
166. Id. at 1529. The Court explained:
Other forms of land use regulation, however, can also be said to transfer wealth
from the one who is regulated to another. Ordinary rent control often transfers
wealth from landlords to tenants by reducing the landlords' income and the
tenants' monthly payments, although it does not cause a one-time transfer of
value as occurs with mobile homes. Traditional zoning regulations can transfer
wealth from those whose activities are prohibited to their neighbors; when a
property owner is barred from mining coal on his land, for example, the value
of his property may decline but the value of his neighbor's property may rise.
The mobile home owner's ability to sell the mobile home at a premium may
make this wealth transfer more visible than in the ordinary case, . . . but the





Nor did it matter that the ordinance transferred wealth to specific
individuals. While possibly relevant to the balancing test of whether the
regulation went "too far," that distinction has "nothing to do with
whether the ordinance causes a physical taking." 16 7 Unless the govern-
ment regulation amounts to a "physical invasion" of the land, regulation
constitutes a taking only if it interferes with the reasonable investment-
backed expectations of the owner.
The second Supreme Court decision, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council, 68 was more favorable for landowners. Lucas was a challenge
to governmental regulation of a particular parcel where the regulation
had allegedly denied the owner any "economically viable use" of the
property. The state argued that the economic impact of the regulation
was irrelevant because the legislature had found that the restrictions
imposed were necessary to prevent harm to the public.
Lucas involved the application of state law regulating beaches to
two residential lots owned by the plaintiff. As early as 1977, state law
required permits for new uses in critical areas of beachfront.' 69 The
residential subdivision in which the Lucas lots were located was not part
of a critical area under the 1977 Act, and Lucas and others began
developing the subdivision. In 1986, Lucas purchased the two lots from
the development company. Two years later, South Carolina adopted the
Beachfront Management Act. The new law precluded construction of
occupiable improvements within a "baseline" that included the lots Lucas
had purchased. 70
The trial court ruled that the Beachfront Management Act was a
taking of Lucas' property because it allowed no "reasonable economic
use of the lots.' 7' While the case was being appealed to the South
Carolina Supreme Court, the legislature amended the Act to allow the
issuance of "special permits" for some cases where the Act would
ordinarily forbid construction. 172 However, the state court elected to
167. Id. at 1530 ("Whether the ordinance benefits only current mobile home owners
or all mobile home owners, it does not require [owners of mobile home parks] to submit
to the physical occupation of their land."). Id.
168. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
169. S.C. Code § 48-39-130(A) (1987), described in Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889.
170. S.C. Code §§ 48-39-280(A)(2), -290(A) (Supp. 1991); Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2889-
90.
171. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2890 (quoting trial court decision).
172. Justice Scalia acknowledged that the 1990 legislation would allow Lucas to apply
for a permit "for future construction" and to challenge a permit denial as unconstitutional.
Nonetheless, he gave two reasons for rejecting the argument that the availability of this
remedy precluded Supreme Court review. First, the state court had declined to rely on
the intervening legislation in its opinion. Second, under the decision of the South Carolina
Supreme Court, Lucas could not assert a temporary taking claim for the two years between
1988 and the 1990 legislation. Id. at 2891-92 (emphasis in original).
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sustain the law without considering the amendments. It held that the
Act was not a taking for which compensation was required because it
was aimed at preventing a "serious public harm."''
A divided Supreme Court reversed. 74 Writing for the majority,
Justice Scalia declared that compensation was almost always required
173. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895, 899 (S.C. 1991), rev'd,
112 S. Ct. 2896 (1992).
174. Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2902 (Kennedy,
J., concurring). Justices Blackmun and Stevens prepared dissenting opinions. See id. at
2904 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); and id. at 2917 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Also, Justice
Souter authored a brief dissenting statement. Id. at 2925 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Justice Kennedy's concurrence emphasized the limited scope of the majority opinion.
According to his reading of the opinion, the majority did "not decide the permanent
taking claim" nor did it "foreclose the Supreme Court of South Carolina from considering
the claim or requiring petitioner to pursue an administrative alternative not previously
available." Moreover, the Court's decision did not "decide the ultimate question of whether
a temporary taking has occurred in this case." On remand, the state court had to decide
whether Lucas had "the intent and capacity to develop the property and failed to do so
in the interim period because the State prevented him." Id. at 2902 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). In addition, the state was free, to the extent permitted by state law, to
reexamine the trial court's finding that Lucas' "real property [was] rendered valueless by
the State's regulation." Id. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Perhaps most importantly, Justice Kennedy expressed disagreement with the majority's
definition of "the owner's reasonable, investment-backed expectations" solely in terms of
nuisance. Instead, he would have defined those expectations by reference to "the whole
of our legal tradition." More specifically, he suggested that "[cloastal property may
present such unique concerns for a fragile land system that the State can go further in
regulating its development and use than the common law of nuisance might otherwise
permit." Id. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Justice Blackmun's dissent objected to the Court's decision to review the judgment
of the South Carolina Supreme Court and also to the substantive doctrine that the majority
embraced. He argued that the case was not "ripe for review." In light of the 1990
amendment to the South Carolina statute, he claimed that the state had not yet made
"a final decision about what uses of the property will be permitted." Id. at 2906
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Additionally, he argued that review was inappropriate even if
no jurisdictional barriers existed. The majority "create[d] its new taking jurisprudence
based on the trial court's finding that the property had lost all economic value," but
that finding was "almost certainly erroneous." Id. at 2908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
On the merits, Justice Blackmun criticized the majority opinion for unsettling es-
tablished doctrine. First, he chastised the majority for eroding the presumption of con-
stitutionality on which the state court had relied. Second, he complained that the majority
had created "a new scheme for regulations that eliminate all economic value." Id. at
2909 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In the past, he contended, the Court had "repeatedly
... recognized the ability of government, in certain circumstances, to regulate property
without compensation no matter how adverse the financial effect on the owner may be."
Id. at 2910 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Likewise, the Court had consistently "rejected the
contention that the government's power to act without paying compensation turns on
whether the prohibited activity is a common law nuisance." To the contrary, the Supreme
Court-like the South Carolina court in Lucas-had, in the past, relied "on legislative
judgments of what constitutes a harm." Id. at 2912-13 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (footnote
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when a regulation deprived an owner of "all economically viable use"
of property. Although he recognized the existence of a nuisance exception
to this rule, he construed it very narrowly. The exception only applied
when courts, applying "background principles" of state property law,
would find that the proscribed use was a nuisance.17"
omitted).
Justice Stevens also dissented both from the Court's decision to review the state
court judgment in Lucas and from the substantive doctrine that the majority embraced:
"Proper application of the doctrine of judicial restraint would avoid the premature
adjudication of an important constitutional question. Proper respect for our precedents
would avoid an illogical expansion of the concept of 'regulatory takings."' Id. at 2917
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
Unlike Justice Blackmun, Justice Stevens perceived no jurisdictional barrier to the
Court's consideration of the Lucas petition. However, he did object to the Court's decision
to review the South Carolina judgment as inconsistent with the prudential rule that cautions
against deciding a constitutional issue when that decision is not required. Because the
record did not indicate that the two-year delay between the 1988 and 1990 acts caused
Lucas any harm, it was not "clear that he had a viable 'temporary takings' claim." Id.
at 2917-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Substantively, Justice Stevens criticized the majority's holding on two grounds: "The
categorical rule the Court establishes is an unsound and unwise addition to the law and
the Court's formulation of the exception to that rule is too rigid and too narrow." Id.
at 2918 (Stevens, J., dissenting). He argued that, "[in addition to lacking support in
past decisions, the Court's new rule is wholly arbitrary." It allowed full recovery by "a
landowner whose property is diminished 100%," but provided no recovery for the "land-
owner whose property is diminished in value 95%." Id. at 2919 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
As for the nuisance exception recognized by the majority, Justice Stevens criticized it on
the ground that it "effectively freezes the States's common law, denying the legislature
much of its traditional power to revise the law governing the rights and uses of property."
Id. at 2921 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Souter objected to the majority's disposition on procedural grounds. He would
have dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. "After briefing and ar-
gument," he argued, it had become "abundantly clear" that the case rested on "an
unreviewable assumption" that was "both questionable as a conclusion of Fifth Amend-
ment law and sufficient to frustrate the Court's ability to render certain the legal premises
on which its holding rests." The "unreviewable assumption" was the trial court's conclusion
"that the state .. .had deprived the owner of his entire economic interest in the subject
property." In light of prior decisions, that conclusion was "questionable," but it was
not reviewable because it was "not fairly included within the question presented" in the
petition for certiorari. Because the "questionable conclusion of total deprivation" was
unreviewable, the Court's attempt to clarify taking law was doomed to failure. Without
reviewing that issue, the majority could not clarify the concept of total taking "which
the Court [itself] describe[d] ... as so uncertain under existing law as to have fostered
inconsistent pronouncements by the Court itself." Id. at 2925 (Souter, J., dissenting). As
a result, "the issue of what constitutes a total deprivation is being addressed by indirection,
and with uncertain results, in the Court's treatment of defenses to compensation claims."
In light of these uncertainties, he voted "to dismiss the writ, despite the Court's contrary
preference." Id. at 2926 (Souter, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 2900.
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Acknowledging that regulatory takings claims were normally "ad
hoc, factual inquiries,' ' 7 6 Justice Scalia identified two exceptions to the
usual balancing test. The first was the familiar one for "physical"
invasions of property. 7 " The second was new: A regulation also amounts
to a taking whenever it denies the owner "all economically beneficial
or productive use of land."'"
Justice Scalia conceded that some cases had suggested that a reg-
ulation that denied the owner all economically beneficial or productive
use of property was not a taking when the government was preventing
a "harmful or noxious use." However, he dismissed the most expansive
of those opinions as concerned with the permissibility of the govern-
mental action rather than with the narrower question of whether the
government should have to pay for the private interests destroyed by
its action. In his view, the so-called nuisance exception was a narrow
one. When a regulation deprives an owner of "all economically viable
use" of land,1 79 the government may avoid compensating the owner
"only if the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner's
estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title
to begin with."' 80
In essence, the nuisance exception as defined by Justice Scalia turns
on preexisting rules of property law. Although the legislature may impose
restrictions based on those preexisting limits, it must compensate an
owner when modification of the prior rules denies an owner all eco-
nomically viable use of the property. Compensation is required unless
the law does "no more than duplicate the result that could have been
achieved in the courts-by adjacent landowners (or other uniquely af-
fected persons) under the State's law of private nuisance, or by the
State under its complementary power to abate nuisances that affect the
public generally, or otherwise."''
Because the South Carolina Supreme Court had allowed a broader
scope for state regulations than the Eminent Domain Clause permitted,
the Supreme Court reversed the state court judgment and remanded the
case for further proceedings. Although Justice Scalia expressed doubts
176. Id. at 2893 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S.
104, 124, 98 S. Ct. 2646, 2659 (1978); Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590,
594, 82 S. Ct. 987, 990 (1962)).
177. See supra notes 148-149 and accompanying text.
178. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893.
179. Justice Scalia conceded that the government may have more extensive regulatory
authority over movable property "at least if the property's only economically productive
use is sale or manufacture for sale." Id. at 2899-90 (citing Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S.
51, 100 S. Ct. 318 (1979)).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 2900 (footnote omitted).
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as to whether the nuisance exception could properly be applied to the
Lucas property,8 2 he recognized that the issue was one of state law on
which the state supreme court was presumably the final authority.
Like most modern decisions, the new opinions of the United States
Supreme Court continue to focus on economic impact in deciding eminent
domain challenges to governmental regulations. Yee resisted the invitation
to convert the "physical" taking cases into a broad per se rule that
applies whenever government conditions operating in a regulated envi-
ronment on the transfer of property rights to a third party. Instead,
those conditions will amount to takings only when they interfere with
the reasonable investment-backed expectations of property owners. Sim-
ilarly, Lucas declined to make the nuisance exception a pliable loophole
that would make the economic impact of regulations irrelevant whenever
an imaginative legislature could plausibly assert that a regulation was
designed to prevent harm to the public.
Yee suggests that no radical reformulation of taking law is imminent.
The Court unanimously resisted the invitation to expand the list of
categorical takings to protect regulated enterprises from regulations with
redistributive consequences. Thus, in the future as in the past, the vast
majority of regulatory taking claims are likely to turn on the economic
impact of the challenged regulation.
The impact that Lucas will have on current taking doctrine is less
certain. Read narrowly, its influence is insubstantial. The opinion covers
only those very rare cases when the governmental regulation denies "all
economically, viable use" of the property with less onerous burdens
governed by the traditional "ad hoc, factual inquiries" that balance the
economic impact against the governmental interest served by the regu-
lation. Not many land use regulations are strict enough to satisfy the
Lucas standard; indeed, the Lucas regulation itself may not be that
strict. "
Read more broadly, however, Lucas has the potential for substan-
tially altering current doctrine. It clearly reflects a greater sensitivity to
the burdens that regulations impose upon individual landowners, and it
may proscribe inquiry into the reason for the government's action in
determining whether a compensable, taking has occurred. If the reason
for the government's interest is irrelevant in deciding whether a taking
has occurred when a regulation deprives the owner of all economically
182. Id. at 2901 ("It seems unlikely that common-law principles would have prevented
the erection of any habitable or productive improvements on petitioner's land; they rarely
support prohibition of the 'essential use' of land.") (citation omitted).
183. See id. at 2903 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 2908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting);
id. at 2919 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 2925 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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beneficial use, it may also be inappropriate to consider the governmental
interest in the balancing test used for less onerous regulations. If the
Court embraces this extension of Lucas, then any regulation stringent
enough to interfere with an owner's reasonable investment-backed ex-
pectations may be a taking unless it falls under the narrow nuisance
exception that Lucas recognizes.
In future decisions, two issues are likely to be important in deter-
mining how much the Eminent Domain Clause circumscribes regulatory
authority. First, as the majority itself recognized in Lucas, the definition
of the property being regulated is critical. s4 The Supreme Court's recent
decisions have defined property in ways that afford wide scope for
governmental regulations, but at least three members of the Lucas ma-
jority have urged stricter definitions that would require compensation
in more cases.' 85 Second, in the near future, the Court is likely to define
with greater precision how great an economic impact can be imposed
on an individual landowner before compensation must be paid. With
respect to facial challenges, the Court has been extremely reluctant to
find that the economic impact of a regulation is severe enough to
constitute a taking.8 6 Some lower courts have taken a similarly deferential
attitude toward claims of individual landowners,8 7 but the court of
claims has allowed recovery for regulations that significantly impact
individual parcels even when the property retains substantial value. 88
If the Court's previous experience with the Eminent Domain Clause
is a reliable guide, future decisions are not likely to provide a definitive
resolution to the uncertainties of eminent domain law. Most cases are
184. Id. at 2894 n.7.
185. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 518-20, 107 S.
Ct. 1232, 1259-60 (1987) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting joined by Justices Powell, O'Connor,
and Scalia).
186. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n, 480 U.S. 470, 107 S. Ct. 1232; Hodel
v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 101 S. Ct. 2352 (1981).
187. Esposito v. South Carolina Coastal Comm'n, 939 F.2d 165 (4th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 3027 (1992); First Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County
of Los Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1056, 110 S. Ct. 866 (1990).
188. See, e.g., Formanek v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 332 (1992) (denial of a Section
404 permit by the corps of engineers is a taking even though the value of the property
after the permit denial is more than $100,000); Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States,
21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990) (denial of a Section 404 permit by the corps of engineers is a
taking even though the property has a residual value of $500 per acre); see generally
Roger J. Marzulla & Nancie G. Marzulla, Regulatory Takings In the United States Claims
Court: Adjusting the Burdens That In Fairness and Equity Ought To Be Borne By Society
As a Whole, 40 Cath. U. L. Rev. 549 (1991).
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likely to remain "ad hoc, factual inquiries" that turn on minor differ-
ences in the facts of particular cases. Lucas may increase the number
of successful regulatory taking claims, but it will probably not require
compensation for strict government regulations, except perhaps of wet-
lands and other environmentally critical parcels whose economic value
depends almost exclusively on developments with potentially severe en-
vironmental consequences.18 9
At least for state and local regulations,' 90 the substantial role of
state law in eminent domain cases is also likely to hinder the search
for uniformity. Under the Lucas approach, defining the scope of nuisance
law is ordinarily a matter for state courts.' 9' In addition, a footnote
suggests that state law is also critical for defining the property interest
that is being regulated. 192
Regardless of the ultimate resolution of these doctrinal ambiguities,
the Supreme Court's 1992 cases are significant, especially for local
governments. Because the parameters of regulatory authority are vague,
doubt may exist as to whether a particular regulation goes "too far."
That doubt may encourage governmental caution in imposing new re-
gulations because the government will have to pay compensation if it
crosses the uncertain line separating regulations and takings. Moreover,
if a regulation does cross the line, it will constitute a taking for the
time it remains in effect even if the government subsequently repeals
or modifies it; and compensating the landowner for that time could be
expensive.
Local governments, who are the primary regulators of land use in
most states, are most likely to be constrained by these practical con-
siderations. No single judgment will have a significant impact on the
federal budget, so federal agencies will probably litigate to define the
189. See cases cited in supra note 188; see also Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United
States, 926 F.2d 1169 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 406 (1991) (surface mining
act's prohibition against mining of alluvial valley floors constituted a taking of a property
owner's right to mine a single specific deposit of coal); Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United
States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990) (landowner was entitled to compensation in the amount of
$2,658,000 for denial of a Section 404 permit by the corps of engineers).
190. Because Lucas involved a state regulation, Justice Scalia did not decide if state
nuisance law would also define when a federal regulation was so onerous that compensation
was required.
191. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2901-02 (1992).
192. Id. at 2894 n.7
The answer to this difficult question [of defining the property that is being
regulated] may lie in how the owner's reasonable expectations have been shaped
by the State's law of property-i.e., whether and to what degree the State's
law has accorded legal recognition and protection to the particular interest in
land with respect to which the takings claimant alleges a diminution in (or
elimination of) value.
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scope of their regulatory authority. Although the impact of large judg-
ments on state budgets may be substantial, they may be entitled to
Eleventh Amendment' 93 immunity against monetary judgments. 94 By
contrast, local governments are most vulnerable to individual judgments,
and they lack the protection of the Eleventh Amendment.'9 5 One can,
therefore, reasonably anticipate that they will be the most cautious in
pushing the limits of their authority to regulate immovable property.
193. U.S. Const. amend. XI:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State.
194. See Chavous v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 745 F. Supp. 1168 (D.S.C.
1990), vacated on other grounds, 939 F.2d 165 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
3027 (1992); see generally Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 106 S. Ct. 2932 (1986);
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984); and
Murchison, 1986-1987 Developments, supra note 20, at 318-19.
195. Mt. Heathly City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S. Ct.
568 (1977).
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